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JURISDICTION
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Const, , §78-2-2(3) of
the Utah Code Ann. , and Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P. , confer
jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from an Amended Order Re: Defendants1 Second
Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on
Bond ("Amended Order"), dated May 14, 1990, of the Third Judicial
District court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable

J.

Dennis

Judgment entered

Frederick

presiding

supplementing

the

in this matter on September 26, 1988 with

interest accruing from that date through February 12, 1990 and
additional attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October 31, 1989.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A ttial court's findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Copper State Leasing

Co. v. Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 1988).
A finding is clearly erroneous only if it is without adequate
evidentiary support.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193. When

the terms of the contract are determined to provide for an award
of attorney's fees, they are to be awarded as a matter of legal
right, and the amount of such an award is within the trial
court's discretion.

Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah

1

Ct. App. 1989). A reviewing court will refrain from adjudicating
issues on appeal if, pending the appeal, an event occurs which
makes determination

of the issue presented

renders the case moot.

unnecessary

and

In Interest of A. J. . 736 P.2d 721 (Wyo.

1987); Despain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 1981); Duran v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981).

In this case, the finding of

the trial court regarding the award of additional attorney's fees
is a factual finding which cannot be set aside unless clearly
erroneous and is an award which is clearly within the discretion
of the trial court. The other issues raised by the appellants in
their Brief have been rendered moot by subsequent events.
PRIOR APPEAL
This is the second appeal filed by the appellants in the
action before the trial court. The outcome of appellants' first
appeal was an opinion of this Court, issued on May 25, 1990, in
which this Court affirmed, in its entirety, the ruling of the
trial court as it relates to these appellants.
further,

specifically

affirmed

the

trial

The Opinion,

court's

award

of

attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps evidenced by the unrebutted affidavits of the Sharps1 counsel, Saunders v. Sharp, 135
Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 79 (Utah Ct. App. May 25, 1990), an issue
raised once again by the appellants in this second appeal.
copy of the Opinion is attached hereto as Addendum 1.
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
Citations to the Record will be abbreviated as follows:

2

A

Record on Appeal

"R."

Exhibit

"Ex."

The Addendum includes relevant portions of the record and other
pleadings and shall be cited to as "Add." with the page number
following the citation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The genesis of this second appeal arises from the sale of
certain property located in White Pine Canyon near Park City,
Utah (the "property") by John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (the
Sharps) to the appellants or their predecessors in interest
("White Pine").

To complete the purchase of the property, the

buyers executed certain documents including a Trust Deed (Ex. 2,
Add. 6-9) and Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3/ Add. 10) and Memorandum of
Closing Terms (the "Memo) (Ex. 15, Add. 11-15) (collectively, the
"Agreement") and agreed to act in accordance with the terms and
conditions contained therein.

The Trust Deed Note provides for

default interest to be charged on the payments thereunder at the
rate of 18% per annum, and provides that if it "is collected by
an attorney after default . . . the undersigned [White Pine] . .
. agree to pay . . . a reasonable attorney's fee."
10).

(Ex. 3, Add.

Paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed provides that sums expended

thereunder by the beneficiary or trustee shall bear interest at
the rate of 10% per annum from the date of expenditure until
paid, and contains three separate provisions for the recovery of
attorney's fees.

(Ex. 2, Add. 7-8)

3

Paragraph 6 provides that

the beneficiary [the Sharps] "may commence, appear in and defend
any action . . . and . . • employ counsel, and pay his reasonable
fees."

Paragraph 7 then requires trustor [White Pine] to "pay

immediately . . . all sums expended hereunder by beneficiary,lf
including sums expended in paragraph 6.

Finally, under para-

graph 16, the Sharps are entitled to "foreclose the Trust Deed
[and] . • . recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses
incident therein, including a reasonable attorneyfs fee."

The

Memo provides in paragraph 11 that the "defaulting party shall
pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out
of breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees,
whether incurred with or without suit and both before and after
judgment."

(Emphasis added).

(Ex. 15, Add. 14)

True and

correct copies of the Trust Deed Note, Trust Deed, and Memo are
attached hereto collectively as Addendum 2.
A dispute arose between the parties as to the respective
obligations under the contract and on September 26, 1988, after
concluding that White Pine had materially breached the contract,
the trial court entered Judgment against White Pine in the total
amount of $759,415.63, including $144,088.75 in attorney's fees.
The Judgment categorized the interest on the sums awarded into
the following categories:

(1) interest on principal; (b) inter-

est on costs and expenditures; and
taxes.

(R. 1372, Add. 18)

(c) interest on property

The Judgment further foreclosed the

interest of White Pine in the property and ordered that the

4

property be sold and the proceeds be applied toward amounts due
under the Judgment.

(R. 1370-77, Add. 19-20) A true and correct

copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 3.
White Pine timely perfected the filing of an appeal of the
Judgment (R. 1440-1442) and on May 25, 1990, this Court affirmed,
in its entirety, the ruling of the trial court as it related to
White Pine.

Saunders v. Sharp, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Ct.

App. May 25, 1990).

(Add. 1-5) White Pine's Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari is now pending before the Supreme Court.
On May 14, 1990, the trial court entered the Amended Order
Re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion
to Increase Liability on Bond ("Amended Order") (R. 2197-2205,
Add. 24-32) which supplemented the Judgment with interest through
February 12, 1990, the date on which the Motion was heard.

A

true and correct copy of the Amended Order is attached hereto as
Addendum 4. The Amended Order also granted additional attorney's
fees incurred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through
October 31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount
excluded certain categories set forth in a Summary of Plaintiffs1
Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as defendants' Exhibit 2
at the hearing on defendants' Motion.
were:
Appeal."

"Settlement,"
(Add. 27)

The excluded categories

"Attorney's Fees," and

"Tracy

Collins

The Amended Order specifically categorized

the various calculations of interest based upon three unrebutted
Affidavits of Albert D. Nystrom.

5

(R. 1539-49, 1781-90, 2064-66,

Add. 33-57) True and correct copies of the Affidavits of Albert
D. Nystrom, C.P.A., are attached hereto as Addendum 5.

The

Amended Order also required White Pine to pay the delinquent
property taxes on the property securing the supersedeas bond
("Lot

1") and to post additional security in the amount of

$136,899.00 on or before March 15, 1990.

(R. 2202, Add. 29) In

the event White Pine failed to post the additional security by
March 15, 1990, the Order staying proceedings would be vacated
and the Sharps would be allowed to proceed with their remedies,
including foreclosure, as provided in the September 26, 1988
Judgment.
On July 12, 1990, White Pine filed identical Motions for
Stay of Remittitur and Judgment Pending Review and for Approval
of Supersedeas Bond simultaneously in the trial court (R. 22542257) and in this Court.

In an Order dated July 18, 1990, this

Court refused to consider the Motion based on lack of jurisdiction.

(Add. 58) The district court also denied the Motion of

White Pine by way of a Minute Entry dated August 1, 1990.
59)

(Add.

True and correct copies of the Orders are attached hereto

collectively as Addendum 6. On August 2, 1990, White Pine filed
a Motion for Stay Pending Action on Petition for Certiorari and
supporting Memorandum in the Utah Supreme Court.

A true and

correct copy of the Motion is attached hereto as Addendum 7.1

1

White Pinefs Petition for Certiorari is still pending
before the Utah Supreme Court.
6

The Motion for Stay was granted but the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the district court for the purpose of fixing the
amount of the bond.

(Add. 73)

A true and correct copy of the

Order of the Utah Supreme Court is attached hereto as Addendum 8.
On August 23, 1990, the parties hereto entered into a
Stipulation pursuant to which White Pine posted

additional

security for a supersedeas bond in the amount of $136,899.00 as
required under the Amended Order and the Sharps stipulated to the
adequacy of the security posted, in the form of two certificates
of deposit. A true and correct copy of the Stipulation (without
attachments) is attached hereto as Addendum 9.

Further, the

parties stipulated that as a result of the posting of additional
security, the stay of execution of the Judgment would continue in
effect through October 1, 1990 and after that, until the district
court, after a motion, has determined the amount of any additional bond and the time set for filing the additional bond has
expired.

(Add. 79-81)

On November 9, 1990, in an effort to simplify the issues
raised on appeal, the Sharps filed in district court a Motion to
Amend the Amended Order to delete from the Amended Order, the
phrase "for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as of February 12,
1990," the phrase to which White Pine objects in this Appeal. A
true and correct copy of the Motion to Amend the Amended Order is
attached hereto as Addendum 10. This Motion is currently before
the trial court.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Sharps agree they are not entitled to compound

interest but deny the Amended Order has that effect. The Amended
Order specifically categorizes each calculation of interest to
avoid any compounding of interest. The Sharps are not seeking to
compound interest and have, in an effort to simplify the issues
on appeal, filed a Motion in the trial court to amend the Amended
Order and delete the phrase "for a total judgment of $938,053.02
as of February 12, 1990."
2.
the

The Stipulation pursuant to which the parties agreed to

sufficiency

of

two

certificates

of

deposit

totaling

$136,899.00 as good and sufficient security for their supersedeas
bond and the actual posting of that bond by White Pine has
rendered the issue of whether the trial court entered an order
exceeding the nature and issues raised by the pleadings moot.
Accordingly, the argument relating to that issue need not be
considered by this Court.
3.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to

enter the Amended Order since the issues of an increase in the
supersedeas bond and award of attorney's fees were collateral to
the issues raised by White Pine in its first appeal and involved
matters necessary for the protection of the rights of the Sharps
pending the outcome of the appeal.
the Utah

Supreme

Court

In fact, both this Court and

recognized

the trial

court

appropriate forum for the bond issues to be determined.

8

as the

4.

The supplementation of the Judgment by the amount of

the attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps is in accordance with
the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the Trust Deed and the Memo
constituting the Agreement between the parties and comes within
the purview of the language of the Judgment and enforcing the
Agreement between the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
COMPOUND INTEREST IS NOT AWARDED
IN THE AMENDED ORDER SUPPLEMENTING
THE JUDGMENT.
The rate of interest to be awarded on judgments is governed
by §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., which provides:
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the
interest agreed upon bv the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment; other
judgments shall be interest at the rate of
12% per annum.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the Agreement between the parties provided for
different rates of interest.

The payments to be made under the

Trust Deed Note, once in default, are to bear the interest rate
of 18% per annum.

(Ex. 3, Add. 10)

Expenditures made by the

beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, however, bear interest at
the rate of 10% per annum.

(Ex. 2, Add. 7)

terms of the Utah statute, attorneyfs

Pursuant to the

fees awarded accrued

interest at the rate of 10% per annum pre-judgment and 12% per
annum after judgment. Accordingly, the Sharps presented detailed
9

Affidavits of Albert D. Nystrom, a certified public accountant,
presenting the calculations of all of the various interest rates
and the per diem rates thereon.
Add. 33-57)

(R. 1539-49, 1782-90, 2064-66,

Those affidavits were unrebutted by White Pine.

In accordance with the calculations of Albert D. Nystrom,
paragraph 2 of the Amended Order provides for the supplementation
of the Judgment in the amount of $231,636.97 and itemizes the
supplementation into specific categories.

(R. 2197-2205, Add.

26-27) Subparagraph 2(b) sets forth pre-judgment interest at 10%
from March 22, 1988, the date on which the trial court made its
bench ruling in the trial of this matter to September 26, 1988,
the date on which the Judgment was finally entered. Subparagraph
2(c) of the Amended Order then sets forth post-judgment interest
at specific per diem rates calculated by Albert D. Nystrom from
September 26, the date of the entry of the Judgment through
February 12, 1990, the date of the hearing on the Motion to
Supplement the Judgment. (R. 1539-49, 1782-90, 2064-66; Add. 2627)
The Sharps agree that they are not entitled to compound
interest. The specific itemization of the interest was calculated for the very purpose of avoiding any compounding of interest.
Additionally, although the Sharps deny that the Amended Order has
the effect of compounding interest, they have submitted a Motion
in the district court to amend the Amended Order to delete the
phrase "for a total Judgment of $938,053.02" which phrase, White

10

Pine claims, at pages 9 and 13 of its Brief, is objectionable and
results in compounding of interest.

(Add. 85-87)

White Pine's

appeal as to the issue of interest is, therefore, without merit.
POINT II
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
ENTERED AN ORDER EXCEEDING THE NATURE
AND ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
HAS BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
Generally, an appellate court should dismiss an appeal if,
pending the appeal, an event occurs which makes determination of
the issue presented unnecessary and renders the case moot.
Interest of A. J.. 736 p.2d 721 (Wyo. 1987).

In

In that event, the

case is moot and the court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits.

Despain v. Stewart. 639 P.2d 166 (Utah

1981); Duran v. Morrisf 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981).
Here, White Pine's objections to the provisions of the
Amended Order vacating the stay and requiring the posting of
additional security, at pages 15-20 of its Brief, have been
rendered moot by White pine's own actions subsequent to the entry
of that Order.

White Pine has entered into a Stipulation by

which White Pine agreed to post, and has now, in fact, posted the
additional $136,899.00 required by the Court and by which the
Sharps agreed to the sufficiency of the form of the security for
the additional $136,899.00.

(Add. 74-80)

The terms of the

Stipulation further render moot the objection to the vacation of
the stay since the parties agree therein that the stay shall
continue in effect as does the prior Order of the Utah Supreme
IX

Court.

(Add. 74-80, 73) Accordingly, it is unnecessary for this

Court to consider the issue any further.2
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO ENTER THE AMENDED ORDER.
On remand, a district court has jurisdiction to interpret
the decision and mandate of an appellate court.

Berland's. Inc.

v. Northside Shopping Center, 447 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1968). In this
case, both this Court and the Supreme Court determined jurisdiction to determine the bonding issue was in the district court.
In order to determine the amount of the bond, and to protect the
Sharps against damages accruing during the pendency of the
appeal, the district court, necessarily, had to determine the
amounts by which the Judgment against White Pine had increased,
taking into account interest and attorney's fees since the time
the prior bond amount had been established.

The fact that an

appeal has been filed in a matter and a supersedeas bond posted
does not stay the accrual of the obligations which are the
subject of the appeal. Lund v. Lund. 6 Utah 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856
(1957).

The entry of the Amended

Order supplementing the

Judgment is a logical corollary of the determination of the bond
amount.

2

Even if the issue is not moot, the Amended Order reflects
what happens by operation of law. Under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule
62 (d) , a stay is effective only when the supersedeas bond is
approved by the court. A court cannot approve a bond until it is
posted.
12

Even in absence of remand, a trial court has jurisdiction to
consider issues collateral to the appeal.
Utah, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1990).

White v. State of

A trial court also has

the authority to consider applications for attorney's fees and
matters relating to supersedeas bonds and the modification of
injunctions during the pendency of an appeal.

Venen v.

Sweet,

758 F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1985).
In White, a case relied on by White Pine for its assertion
the district court lacked jurisdiction

defendants brought a

motion to modify the judgment against them to reflect a credit
for the amounts they claim to have paid, thereby reducing the
amount of the Judgment. In holding the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the motion, the Supreme Court stated:
An adjudication of the motion, though a
modification of the judgment may result,
will not affect the legal issues raised here
with respect to attorney's fees and defendant's liability. Under these circumstances, we see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while the district court has the matter
under consideration as that will only delay
proceedings. . . . If the motion is granted, the trial court in this case need only
advise this court that the judgment has been
modified. The district court action granting or denying the motion and the modified
judgment should be included in the record
when it is prepared for review by this
court.
Id. at 4.
Other jurisdictions considering the matter have determined
that a trial court is not deprived of the power to require an
additional injunction bo^d or the power to dissolve such an
13

injunction upon failure to file a bond and have specifically
found that a trial court retains jurisdiction to test the
sufficiency of an appeal bond.

In Porter v. Superior Court, 78

Cal. App. 790, 248 P. 1077 (Cal. 1926), a motion to increase the
amount of an injunction bond as a condition of keeping the
injunction in force was filed in the trial court after an appeal
had been perfected.

The Court stated:

As the jurisdiction of respondent court to
increase the amount of the undertaking
before the appeal was taken from the judgment was plainly existent, and as the appeal
did not transfer to the appellate tribunal
the matters incident to the giving of the
undertaking, it appears plain to us that
respondent court has jurisdiction, despite
the appeal, to order an increase in the
amount of the undertaking, even though the
final result may be that the injunction will
be set aside for a failure to give the new
undertaking. There is as great danger to
the rights of defendant in the action from
an insufficiency of the undertaking, which
insufficiency appears after the appeal, as
from an insufficiency which might have
appeared before the appeal.
Under such
circumstances, the jurisdiction to order a
sufficient undertaking must rest somewhere,
and, as it does not reside in the appellate
tribunal after the appeal, it must still
abide in the superior court.
Id. at 1078.
In Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268 (Ala. 1976), the Alabama
Supreme Court held a motion for additional supersedeas bond was
collateral to the issues which had been appealed.
[T]he Rileys1 motion for an additional
supersedeas bond is part of a proceeding
that is separate and distinct from the
decree appealed from. The question present14

ed by the Rileys1 motion, that is, whether
the original $5,000 supersedeas bond adequately protected the Rileys1 interest in
the court1s order entered in their favor,
does not involve the rights and equities
relative to the question of whether their
deed should have been set aside.
The
Rileys1 motion does not raise any question
going behind the decree appealed from, nor
does it raise any question decided by that
decree. In short, the Rileys1 motion presented a question which is clearly collateral to the questions raised by Osborn's
appeal of the court order setting aside the
deed.
Id, at 272.

The court further recognized the trial court's

jurisdiction to rightfully make orders that are needful for the
preservation of the res and the rights of the parties pending to
the appeal.

"So it is that the Rileys1 motion for additional

bond involved a matter necessary for the full protection of their
rights pending Osborn's appeal . . . ." Id. White Pine's appeal
of this issue is disturbing, to say the least, since both this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have, in effect, told White Pine
that jurisdiction of the bonding issue is in the district court.
White Pine cites the case of In re: Federal Facilities
Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1955), for the proposition
that a district court has no power to revoke a stay once an
appeal has been taken.

The holding of that case, however, has

been criticized and appears to have been abrogated by Rule 8(a),
Fed. R. A P P . P. . which requires "application for a stay of a
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal, or for
approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending,
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modifying, restoring granting an injunction during the pendency
of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the
district court,"

(Emphasis added.)

Rule 8, Utah R. App. P. is

substantially similar to Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P. and appears to
recognize the reality that an appellate court is ill-equipped to
take evidence or make factual determinations as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond, as the Utah Supreme Court and this
Court so held with these parties.

Swasev v. Rocky Point Ditch

Co. , 649 P.2d 1 (Utah 1982) (decided under former Utah R. Civ. P. .
Rule 73).
If the appellate court cannot take evidence, and, as White
Pine asserts, the district

court has no jurisdiction, the

illogical result is that a judgment holder is left with no forum
in which his security will be protected, even if, subsequent to
the filing of the appeal, the security is lost, destroyed, or
devalued, an absurd result.
In In re: Long. 93 Br. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988), the court
noted that the holding of Federal Facilities had been incorporated into former Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(e).

The court noted:

The former rule's provision that the docketing of an appeal divests the lower court of
jurisdiction to address matters relating to
the bond or to a stay pending appeal was
rejected when Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure was adopted.
The
advisory committee note to Rule 8(a) states:
The requirement of FRCP 73(e) appears
to be a concession to the view that
once an appeal is perfected, the district court loses all power over its
16

judgment. See In re; Federal Facilities Realty Trust. 227 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1955) and cases cited at 654-655.
No reason appears why all questions
related to supersedeas or the bond for
costs on appeal should not be presented
in the first instance to the district
court in the ordinary case.
In re: Long, 93 Br. at 791.

See also Venen v. Sweet. 758 F.2d

117 (3rd Cir. 1985)(district court, during the pendency of an
appeal is not divested of jurisdiction to determine an application for attorney's fees or to issue orders regarding the filing
of bonds or supersedeas bonds or to modify, restore or grant
injunctions).
As noted above, in order to determine the damages which
would accrue during the pendency of White Pine's appeal and the
sufficiency and amount of the bond to be posted by White Pine,
the district court was required to make a determination of the
amount of attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps, since attorney's fees are an integral part of damages incurred by the stay
of execution.

Cf. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,

Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258# 1262 (Utah 1984).
Here, the award of additional attorney's fees is collateral
to the issues raised in White Pine's first appeal.

In Finst

Div., Inc. v. Bermaor, 449 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) , the court held that the mere fact a first judgment was on
appeal did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to enter
a subsequent judgment for attorney's fees, stating:
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A proceeding seeking attorneys1 fees and
costs pursuant to the primary judgment is
not a proceeding to enforce the primary
judgment, and a supersedeas of such primary
judgment does not, any more than the appeal
therefrom, divest the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding, to
enter the ancillary judgment, and to provide
for its enforcement unless such ancillary
judgment is independently superseded.
(Footnote omitted.)

Id.

See also Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App.

122, 485 A.2d 270 (1985)(Trial court has jurisdiction to award
attorney's fees after appeal of the case in chief; determination
of issue within the sound discretion of the trial court); Venen
v. Sweet. 758 F.2d at 120 (3rd Cir. 1985)(district court during
pendency

of an appeal

is not

divested

of jurisdiction

to

determine an application for attorney's fees).
POINT IV
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDGMENT BY
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
BY THE SHARPS IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
JUDGMENT NOR THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.
In Utah where provided

for by contract, the award of

attorney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah

1988); Turtle Mat, v. Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982).
When the terms of the contract are determined to provide for an
award of attorney's fees, they are to be awarded as a matter of
legal right.

Saunders v. Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 79 (Utah

Ct. App. May 25, 1990).

In its first appeal, White Pine argued,

also, that the award of attorney's fees in the first Judgment was
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improper. This Court, however, rejected that contention stating:
"Based on the court's determination that buyers breached the
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract, the trial court
properly ruled that sellers were entitled to their attorney fees
[sic] reasonably incurred.11
then concluded:

Saunders at 70.

The trial court

"At the court's instruction, sellers' counsel

submitted an affidavit and supporting documents as evidence of
reasonableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's determination that this affidavit, never rebutted, was
sufficient to support an award of fees. Id. The Sharps' counsel
followed the same procedure for the second award of fees.

(R.

1791-1885)
White Pine argues in its Brief that somehow the Judgment
limits the areas in which the Sharps can recover attorney's fees,
ignoring, totally, the underlying Agreement upon which the
Judgment is based.

In this case, the attorney's fees can be

awarded because they are authorized by the contractual terms to
which White Pine agreed.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d

985, 988 (Utah 1988)(Citing Golden Key Realty. Inc. v. Mantos,
699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985)).

Contractual obligations to pay

attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a contract include fees
incurred on appeal. Redevelopment Agency v. Dasakalas. 119 Utah
Adv. Rep. 70 (Utah App. October 11, 1989); Cobabe v. Crawford,
780 P.2d

834, 837

(Utah App. 1989); Management

Servs. v.

Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980).
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The Trust Deed, the Trust Deed Note and the Memo, comprising
the parties1 Agreement in this case, all include clauses relating
to awards of attorney's fees.
Three separate provisions of the Trust Deed alone provide
for the recovery of attorney's fees.

(Ex. 2, Add. 7-8)

Para-

graph 6 provides that the beneficiary (Sharps) "may commence,
appear in and defend any action . . . and . . . employ counsel,
and pay his reasonable fees." Paragraph 7 then requires trustor
(White Pine Ranches) to "pay immediately" "all sums expended
hereunder by Beneficiary," especially including sums expended in
paragraph 6.

Finally, under paragraph

16, the Sharps are

entitled to "foreclose the Trust Deed [and] . . . recover in such
proceeding all costs and expenses incident therein, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
The Trust Deed Note provides that if it "is collected by an
attorney after default . . . the undersigned [White Pine Ranches]
. . . agree to pay . . . a reasonable attorney's fee."

(Ex. 3,

Add. 10)
Finally, under the Memo, paragraph 11, "the defaulting party
shall pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising
out of breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees,
whether incurred with or without suit and before and after
Judgment."

(Emphasis added.)

(Ex. 15, Add. 14)

White Pine seems to assert that the language in the Judgment
"and after prevailing in any appeal" somehow limits the recovery
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of fees in the interim.

The word "and" is used to connect words

or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added or
taken along with the first in addition to that which immediately
precedes.

3A CJS "And" (1979).

Accordingly, the phrase "and

after prevailing in any appeal" as stated in the Judgment is in
addition to the other phrases "preparation of the Findings11,
"responding to any post-trial motions", and "collecting said
Judgment" and not intended as a limitation to the language
contained in the parties1 Agreement.
This Court recently dealt with the scope of enforcement of
a contract

for which attorney's fees are recoverable.

In

Dasakalas, supra, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
condemned certain property in which tenants held a leasehold
interest.

The tenants made a claim for a portion of the

condemnation award asserting they had a compensable interest in
the property, which claim the owners contested.

The trial court

granted the owners1 motion for summary judgment and ordered the
tenants to pay the owners1 attorney's fees pursuant to the terms
of the lease agreements which provided as follows:
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and
attorney's fees and expenses that shall
arise from enforcing the terms and provision
of this lease.
This Court held that the owners were contractually entitled to
the award of attorney's fees, stating:
Owners successfully resisted their [the Tenants] claim for compensation on the grounds
that it was a violation of the "terms and
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provisions of this lease". Thus the Owners
are contractually entitled to collect attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending against Tenants' claims because they
were enforcing the lease terms.
Id. at 77.
In this case, the attorney's fees incurred post-judgment
(all of which have been paid in full by the Sharps as of
November 30, 1989, see Affidavit of Kathy A. F. Davis (R. 2050,
2052)) have arisen out of or are a result of the breach or
default of White Pine, and have been incurred in enforcing the
rights of the Sharps under the terms of the contract by successfully

resisting

the claims

asserted

by White

Pine

in its

Complaint and on appeal. Redevelopment Agency v. Dasakalas. 119
Utah Adv. Rep. 70

(Utah App. October 11, 1989) .

Indeed,

appellants' objections to the fees are a reflection of how
litigious they are. The Sharps have been required, over the past
four years, to litigate, defend and relitigate this matter in
four separate forums and, now, twice in this Court.
J. Richard Rees claims an interest in the subject property
(Ex. 46) and in order to proceed with a foreclosure of the
property,

it was necessary to obtain the release

from the

bankruptcy he filed of that interest in the property.3

In order

3

In fact, it was Robert Felton, one of the plaintiffs
herein, who filed an Objection to defendants' Motion for Relief
from the Automatic Stay in the Rees Bankruptcy, which Objection
will necessitate further legal action.
Copies of the Order
Modifying the Automatic Stay and Feltonfs Objection are attached
hereto collectively as Addendum 11.
22

to obtain clear title to the property and successfully complete
a foreclosure, it was necessary to obtain consents to judgment
from junior lienholders.
The other categories to which White Pine objects, including
drafting letters to California counsel regarding prospective
buyers, preparing for and attending conferences regarding the
development

of White

Pine Ski Resort

and having

telephone

conversations about an interested buyer are all categories
excluded from the award of attorney's fees in paragraph 3(a) of
the Amended Order and taken under advisement by the district
court.

(R. 2200)
CONCLUSION

The Sharps agree they cannot compound interest and deny the
Amended Order has that effect.

Further, the Sharps have filed a

Motion to amend the Amended Order and delete the language which
White Pine finds objectionable.

The issue of whether the

district court could properly vacate a stay of execution has been
rendered moot by the Stipulation of the parties.

The district

court has jurisdiction to supplement the Judgment by the amounts
which continue to accrue on the obligation during the pendency of
the appeal as well as to determine the sufficiency of the
supersedeas bond which was security for the stay of execution.
Attorney's fees are an item of damages included in the recovery
under a supersedeas bond and the trial court appropriately
considered attorneyfs fees in fixing the amount of the supersede-
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as bond and supplementing the Judgment.
ing, the Sharps respectfully

Based upon the forego-

submit that the Amended

Order

entered by the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of November, 1990.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

Dohaldx^/TTT indei
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Attorneys for Appellees Sharp
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and ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation, as Trustee,
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rebutted ...." Bauey, 605 P.2d at 768.

Provo Uun
135 Utan Adv. Rec. 68
of defendants in an action for breach of contract and slander of title. Plaintiffs also appeal
the district court's determination that a temporary restraining order was wrongfully
Cue as
issued, entitling defendants to damages from
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68
injunction bonds posted by, and on behalf of,
plaintiffs. We affirm the judgment on the
IN THE
contract, but reverse the award of damages
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
against the injunction bonds.
This dispute arises from the sale of approLeon H. SAUNDERS; Robert Felton;
ximately 60 acres of land near Park City,
Saunders Land Investment Corporation, a
Utah, owned by John C. and Geraldine Y.
Utah corporation; White Pine Ranches, a
Sharp ("sellers"). Plaintiff White Pine
Utah general partnership; and White Pine
Ranches, a general partnership consisung of
Enterprises, a Utah general partnership,
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, Kenneth R.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Norton, and Paul H. Landes ("buyers"),
v.
purchased the property on July 16, 1981, for
John C. SHARP and Geraldine Y. Sharp,
the purpose of construcung a "Planned Unit
Defendants and Appellees.
Development" (PUD) 2 of four- or five-acre
lots and an internal roadway. Buyers paid
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp,
$620,000 down on a total purchase price of
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs and Appellees,
SI,583,055.30, and executed a mist deed and
v.
note providing for equal annuah installment
Robert Felton: Leon H. Saunders; Saunders
payments of S192,611.06 on the balance due.
Land Investment Corporation; White Pine
An "Offer to Purchase" and "Memorandum
Ranches; White Pine Enterprises,
of Closing Terms" were also executed
Counterclaim-Defendants and Appellees,
(hereafter referred to as the "contract"), and
included the following provisions: (1) upon
and
receipt of the down payment ana recordauon
Kenneth R. Norton, d/b/a Interstate
of a "PUD Plat and Deciarauon of CovenRentals, Inc.,
ants, Condiuons and Restrictions," three lots
Counterclaim-Defendant and Appellant,
of buyers' choice together with the internal
and
roadway connecting the lots to the county
Commissioner of Financial Institutions,
road would be released from the trust deed;
receiver for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust
(2) after recordauon and upon receipt of each
Company,
5140,000 in principal, one PUD lot of buyers'
Surety and Appellant.
choice would be released from the trust deed;
(3) sellers would grant Summit County a strip
No. 880710-CA
of land to widen the county road, or, if the
road was shown to be inaccurately platted, to
No. 880711-CA
grant to the county the road as it existed; (4)
FILED: May 25, 1990
I sellers would warrant marketable utie subject
only to easements and reservations of record;
Third District, Salt Lake County
(5) buyers would provide sellers with a water
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
and sewer connecuon at a pro rata cost, at
such time as the connections became available;
ATTORNEYS:
(6) buyers would sell 50 acre-feet of irrigaRobert M. Anderson, Glen D. Watkms, and
tion
water to sellers for the discounted cost of
Mark R. Gay lord, Salt Lake City, for
$100,000 cash; (7) buyers would be responsible
Plaintiffs
for ail taxes and assessments after assuming
John B. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
possession of the premises; (8) failure to make
Kenneth R. Norton
the annual installment payments within thirty
Stanford B. Owen and Patrick L. Anderson,
days of the annual anniversary date would
consutute a default; and (9) m the event of a
Salt Lake City, for Surety
breach or default, the defaulting party would
Donald J. Winder, Kathy A.F. Davis, and
pay
all expenses, including reasonable attorney
Tamara K. Pnnce, Salt Lake City, for
fees, incurred in enforcing any obligauon or
Defendants
right under the contract.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and
Buyers made installment payments in 1982,
Larson. 1
1983, 1984, and a partial payment in 1985.
Buyers also made certain improvements to the
OPINION
property and the internal roadway at a cost of
over a million dollars, funded m pan by a
BENCH, Judge:
construction loan from Tracy Collins Bank &
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment m favor Trust Company ("Tracv Collins"). On or
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about November 23, 1983, sellers executed a
"Consent to Record" with respect to buyers'
plat describing "Phase I" of the project, which
involved six lots and the roadway. The piat
and a "Declaration of Protective Covenants"
were officially recorded on December 23,
1983. The plat indicated that the internal
roadway was to be private, in contravention of
sellers' intent to have the roadway dedicated
to pubiic use.
Although sellers requested the trustee on
January 18, 1984, to release and reconvey lots
1 through 5, no mention of the roadway was
made, and no reconveyance was recorded until
March 28, 1986. Meanwhile, property taxes
for lot 6 and the unplatted property became
due on November 30, 1984. Of the $4,725
assessed for taxes, buyers paid only 51,515.24.
Buyers aiso paid only a portion of the installment payment due in June 1985.
Sellers subsequently recorded a notice of
default on September 16, 1985, and gave
notice of a trustee's sale of lot 6, the internal
roadway, and ail the unplatted property.
Buyers filed this action on September 4, 1986,
the day before the scheduled trustee's sale,
and were granted an order temporarily restraining the sale. The initial temporary restraining order required a cash bond in the amount
of 52,400, which buyers posted. The parties
thereafter stipulated to an injunction pending
trial, and the district court imposed a 550,000
injunction bond. The bond was posted by
Tracy Collins acting as surety for buyers, in
an attempt to protect its security interest on
the construction loan issued to buyers.
In their complaint, buyers sought specific
performance of certain obligations under the
contraa. specifically, the release of lot 6, the
internal roadway, and 7.35 acres of the unplatted property. Buyers also sought damages
arising from sellers' alleged breach of contract. Sellers counterclaimed, asserting that
buyers had breached the contract. They sought
dissolution of the injunction, damages for its
wrongful issuance, an order of judicial foreciosure on the property, and recovery on the
:rust deed note.
A bench trial was held on January 28-29
ind Marcn 22-25, 1988. The trial court held
hat buyers had materially breached the contract by failing to pay property taxes on lot 6
ind the unplatted acreage, and by failing to
.atisfy their 1985 md 1986 installment obligations. The court .urther held that the contrictual breach occurred before any alleged
>reach by sellers, and that further performnce by sellers was excused after buyers'
Teach. Buyers aiso failed to request release of
ots until after their own breach had already
ccurred, facts which the court believed affeted the credibility of buyers' claims. In conrast, sellers were found to have substantially
ompiied with the terms of the contraa, and
tat the recordation of the Declaration of
^

Proteaive Covenants and the Consent to
Record constituted a release of the roadway.
Judgment was entered for sellers in the
amount of 5759,415.63. This amount included
5144,088.75 in attorney fees, which were
awarded under the terms of the trust deed and
note and the contraa.
After finding that buyers had breached the
contraa. the trial court determined that the
temporary restraining order against sellers had
been wrongfully issued. The court then determined that the appraised fair market value of
the property upon which sellers were entitled
to foreclose was 5728,445. That sum was
deduaed from the total judgment, leaving
sellers undersecured in the amount of
530,970.63. The court awarded sellers that
amount against the bonds by entering judgment on the 52,400 cash bond, in full, and
528,570.63 against the bond posted by Tracy
Collins. The court aiso determined that four
percent of the attorney fees incurred in
defense of the lawsuit could be attributed to
defending against the wrongfully issued injunction, and awarded attorney fees against the
bonds in the amount of 55,763.55. Buyers and
the surety have brought this consolidated
appeal to challenge the respective judgments
against them.
We first consider the appeal brought by
buyers, who argue that the trial court erred in
concluding that they, not sellers, breached the
contraa. Buyers claim entitlement to specific
performance and damages, and argue .that
sellers are precluded from recovering attorney
fees. Buyers aiso claim that the tnai court
erred in concluding that they granted to sellers
an easement over the roadway and that the
temporary restraining order had been wrongfully issued.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
At the conclusion of trial, the court made
oral findings encompassing eight transcribed
pages. Thereafter, the court issued its judgment accompanied by 104 separate findings of
faa. Buyers' bnef lists over two pages of
issues and subissues. Although buyers state
that "the issues presented in this appeal are
questions of law reviewable by an appellate
court for correctness," we conclude, after
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are essentially challenging the trial court's findings of
faa.
Buyers argue that sellers breached the contraa by failing to make all the required reconveyances and that this breach was never
excused by buyers' failure to make specific
requests for those releases. Buyers aiso dispute
the tnai court's finding that the evidence
"established that the parties by both mutual
intent and agreement granted to the Defendants the use of the roadway." Buyers further
contest the finding that sellers substantially
performed their obligations under the com-
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ract. All of these "legal issues," however, | of legal right." Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 836
strike at the trial court's determination of (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,
whether there was a material breach of cont- 625 (Utah 1985)).
ract, and if so, when, and by whom. Such
The contract provides that "the defaulting
questions constitute issues of fact for the fact party shall pay all expenses of enforcing the
finder. See Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, same or any right arising out of breach or
969 (Mont. 1988); Wasserburger v. American default thereof, including reasonable attorScientific Chem., Inc., 267 Or. 77, 514 P.2d neys' fees, whether incurred with or without
1097, 1099 (1973) (en banc); see also American suit and both before and after judgment." We
Petronna Co. v. D & L Oil Supply, Inc., 283 conclude, as the trial court implicitly did, that
Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521, 528 (1978) (substantial this provision is unambiguous. Based on the
performance under a contract is a question of court's determination that buyers breached the
fact).
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract,
Our standard for overturning factual find- the trial court properly ruled that sellers were
ings is a rigorous one—we may not set aside entitled to their attorney fees reasonably incsuch findings unless they are clearly erroneous. urred. See, e.g., Dixon v. Stoddard, 165 P.2d
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 879, 881 (Utah 1988).
761 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To
The amount of such an award is within the
establish clear error, "la)n appellant must trial court's discretion, Cobabe, 780 P.2d at
marshal the evidence in suppon of the find- 836, but must be reasonable, Canyon Country
ings and then demonstrate that despite this Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah
evidence, the trial court's findings are so
1989), and supported by adequate evidence.
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah
weight of the evidence,' ...." In re Bartell, 776 Ct. App. 1988). At the court's instruction,
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. sellers' counsel submitted an affidavit and
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This supporting documents as evidence of reasonburden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact ableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion
that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on in the trial court's determination that this
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when affidavit, never rebutted, was sufficient to
an appellant fails to carry its burden of mar- suppon an award of fees. See id.; see also
shaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d
the merits of challenges to the findings and
1039,1040 (Utah 1975).
accept the findings as valid." Mountain States
THE INJUNCTION BONDS
Broadcasting Co. v. Ncaic, 783 P.2d 551, 553
The
Commissioner
of Financial Institutions
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
We are thus obliged to consider the findings ("Commissioner"), as receiver for Tracy
from the standpoint of the supporting evid- Collins, appeals the judgment against the injence and not from "appellant's view of the unction bonds. The Commissioner seeks to
way he or she believes the facts should have avoid liability by arguing for the first time on
been found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, appeal that the posting of the surety bond was
an ultra vires act by Tracy Collins.
150 (Utah 1987). Since buyers have not marAlthough issues not raised below cannot
shaled the evidence in support of those findings, but merely argue that there is evidence generally be considered on appeal, see James
contradicting them, they have failed to dem- v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), the Commissioner urges us to create an
onstrate that the findings are against the clear
I
exception
to this rule under the theory of
weight of the evidence. We must therefore
"adverse domination." This theory provides
accept the findings as valid and affirm the
that as long as a corporation is controlled or
judgment.
"dominated" by wrongdoers against whom a
cause of action exists, the statute of limitatATTORNEY FEES
With respect to the award of attorney fees, ions is toiled because the wrongdoers cannot
"the court may award reasonable fees in acc- be expected to bring an action against themsordance with the terms of the parties' agree- elves. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson,
ment." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987).
836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Trayner v.
Because Tracy Collins did not have the
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) {per power to act as a surety, the Commissioner
curiam)). Although the interpretation of una- alleges, the bank's officers would have been
mbiguous contractual terms is a question of subjected to liability had they asserted the
law to which the trial court's ruling is affo- ultra vires claim at trial. Therefore, so the
rded no particular deference on appeal, Wilbum argument goes, the Commissioner, as receiver,
v. Interstate Bee,
748 P.2d 582, 584- should now be permitted under the theory of
85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 adverse domination to assert the claim of ultra
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989), when those terms are vires on appeal.
determined to provide for an award of attoAlthough there are exceptions to the rule
rney fees, they are to be "awarded as a matter prohibiting consideration of issues for the first
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time on appeal, they are few in number. See
State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 4748 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (e.g., exceptional
circumstances, piam error, liberty interests).- it
appears that such exceptions are to be applied
only when gross injustice resulting from application of the rule overwhelms its purposethat being to correct errors at trial, avoiding
"a merry-go-round of litigation." Bundy v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah
1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors
Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401
(Utah 1970)).
The Commissioner has brought to our attention no exceptional circumstance to support
the carving out of yet another exception to the
rules of appellate review. Although the Commissioner urges us to adopt its approach by
noting that it was not a party below, buyers
were likewise deprived of the opportunity to
submit the ultra vires issue to the trial court
and have it resolved without the necessity of
this appeal. Since the Commissioner offers no
authority for extending the theory of adverse
domination beyond the limitation of actions
against corporate wrongdoers, and we see no
other reason to do so, we decline to consider
its claim of ultra vires. Accord Wallace Bank
& Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho
712, 237 P. 284, 287 (1925) (ultra vires may
not be asserted for the first time on appeal).
We next address the Commissioner's claim
that the trial court improperiy awarded attorney fees incurred in resisting the temporary
restraining order. The trial court accepted
sellers' calculation that four percent of their
total attorney fees of $144,088.75 were spent
defending against the "injunction."3 The trial
court then awarded 55,763.55 of those fees
against the bonds.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided by
law, no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum as the court
deems proper, for the payment of
such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Our supreme court has determined that
"damages" subject to recovery under this rule
include the attorney fees of the party wrongfully enjoined. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). We have since
extended that recovery to attorney fees incurred as the result of a wrongfully issued temporary restraining order. See Beard v.
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). When attorney fees are incurred in
defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive relief and also against an underlying

U T A H A D V A N C E REPORTS

nnna

71

lawsuit, it is appropriate to determine how
much of the total fees are attributable to resisting the injunction. See id.; see also Artistic
Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486
P.2d 482, 484 (1971) (only the attorney fees
directly related to dissolution of the wrongful
injunction are recoverable). We therefore
affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees
against the bonds.
We last address the Commissioner's argument that the trial court used an incorrect
measure in awarding damages under rule
65A(c) against the injunction bonds. The trial
court calculated damages by adding principal
($371,739.35), interest (5203,664.50), late fees
(514,869.57), taxes (520,368.62), attorney fees
(5144,469.75), trustee's fees (51,803.80), and
costs (52,881.04) for a total of 5759,796.63.
The court next considered the testimony at
trial of a real property appraiser who determined that the fair market value of the unconveyed property was 517,500 to 520,000 per
acre at the time the temporary restraining
order was imposed. The trial court then found
that the value of the property on the date of
judgment was 520,000 per acre, totalling
5728,445.00. Since the value of the property as
collateral was less than the total judgment, the
trial court found that buyers were undersecured and awarded the difference (530,970.63)
as damages for the wrongfully issued iniunction.
The Commissioner claims that this calculation was erroneous, and asserts that the
correct measure of damages is "'the reduction
or diminution in the value of the security
during the period of restraint." Glens Falls
Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 Nev. 196, 427
P.2d 1, 4 (1967). See also Global Contact
Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). We agree. Although
sellers were restrained from foreclosing the
property for approximately two years, they
retained both the trust deed note and the
unconveyed property during that time. The
trial court found that the value of the property
did not diminish in those two years. Any
measure of damages other than a comparison
of the fair market value of the property before
and after the injunction is thus incorrect.
Sellers argue, however, that buyers' argument ignores the concept of "present value."
They contend that the award of interest under
the judgment is inadequate, under the assumption that they would have had available the
interest earning capacity of the foreclosure sale
proceeds had the sale been held as scheduled.
Alternatively, they suggest that an appraisal
showing the value of the property in 1988 to
be the same as that in 1986 actually represents
a decrease in value when the effect of inflation
is taken into account. Aside from the speculative nature of such claims, sellers' interest
losses on the trust deed note were taken into
consideration and awarded as part of the total
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judgment. Interest was awarded at the rate of
twelve percent on the unpaid principal, eighteen percent on the payments m default, and
also included a four percent late payment
cnarge. Surely those charges more than compensated sellers for the interest-beanng potential of money or the effects of inflation
aunng the two-year penod.
In anv event., the Commissioner is correct m
asserting that "recoverable damages under
such a bond are those tnat arise from the
operation of tne injunction itself and not from
damages occasioned by the suit independently
of the injunction.* Beard, 741 P.2d at 969
(quoting Lever Bros. Co. v. International
Chem. Workers Union, 554 T2d 115, 120 (4th
Cir. 1976)). On that basis, the interest accrued
on the trust deed note during the delay m the
sale of the property mav be awarded in the
judgment, as was done in this case, but cannot
also be artnouted as damages under the injunction bond. See Glens Falls, 427 P.2d at 4.
Since sellers did not aemonstrate any damages
attributable to the imposition of the injunction
other than a portion of their attorney fees, the
award of damages against the bonds must be
reversed.
In summary, we affirm the judgment on the
coxnraa. We reverse the award of damages
against the injunction bonds, except for the
attorney fees. Such fees are to be assessed
against the bonds m a proportion to be determined by the trial court.
Affirmed m part, reversed m part, and
remanded. No costs awarded.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pameia T. Greenwood, Judge
John Fan* Larson, Judge
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
1. "Planned unit development' is generally defmed
as a private residential development on acreage of
certain minimum size, usuallv large enougn to constitute a new commumry See Srevens v Essex
Junction Zoning Bd., 139 Vt 297, 428 A.2d HOG,
1103(1981)
3. The reierence to an 'injunction* appears to refer
to both the temporary restraining order and the
stipulated preliminary injunction.
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TRUSTEE/

M

and

BENEFIC2ARY,

WITNESSETH: That Tmstor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALS, ihm Wowm* described property, situated in **<•—*+>
County, State oi UUiu
SEE SXHJBIT *X* JfflSCSED HSSTO AND BY 2SXS SE5E32E2 JNC2RPQRKE2D HESE2X.

Together with ail buddings, fixture! and improvement! thereon and ail water rights, rights of
way, aaaements, rentx, issues, profit*, income, tenements* herediiMmentx. pnvdeges ano appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or heresiter used or en?oyed with said prooerty, or any part thereof
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority herexnaiter riven to and conferred upon
Benerinary to coded and appiy aucn rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment oi the indebtedness evidenced by a pro*
nusaory note of even date herewith, in the prmcpai sum of T **~*, ***• 10
made by
Trustor, payable to the order oi Benerinary at the tunes, in the manner ano with interest as themn
set forth, and any extensions ano/or renewaia or modifications thereof: (2) the performance of
seen agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of aucn additional loans or advance* aa
hereafter may I* made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, wnen evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting thai they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (A) the payment of aU sums
expended or advanced by Bemtnnsry under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereoo as herein provided,
•NCTTE: Tnatfaa aaa* be a n i i h w ef the Utah State Bay; a beak, beildiae sad least
, •
*mi lamm aaaacsauea wUMnud (a aa aaak baeaaea m Utrnhz a oarpacauaa •MJAenseu' <o da « inaa
ULMA; *t « uue ininraare er aaattact aaaoaar auilaaiiart ta da atcn baaiaMg m Uua,

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES:
!. T o keep said properly in food condition and repair* not to remov* or demolish any building tfnreon, to
complete or rtrttot* iirmnptiy and in (Oud and workmanlike manner any budding which may be CMisiructed.
damaged or destroyed liiercon; to comply with *|| la**, c o w n a n u and restrKttrms t t f i i t u i ( su«i property; not
us commit or j«»nu< «<w»ut lUctcoi; not U» commit, suite* or ^>ero»i any acl »?*>n **>d property >n vM>>ai»>n L4 }*«*? to
do ail uiher w u which from the character or usa of said property may bo reasonably necessary, tha specific
anumeratiuna herein nut excluding (he general; and, if tha loan secured hereby or any part thereof la being 06*
tamed (or U10 purpoee; uf financing eonatructioa of improvements on said property. Tmator further agrees:
(at T o commence construction promptly and lo pursue tame with reasonable dilifvnce (o completion
In accordance with plana and specification* satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary La inspect laid property at all times durtnf construction.

Trust**, upon presentation to it 04 ah sffklavit signed by Brncficiary, setting forth facta showing « default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, 1a authorized to accept aa true and conclusive ail facta and statementa therein and to act thereon hereunder.
2. T o provide and maintain Insurance. of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on
the tmpniwment* now rusting or hereafter erected or pi ACvd on said property Such insurance shall be carried
in comiKinies s p p r o w d by Beneficiary with !i»ea payable clauses in favor ul and in form uicepiahle to Benefiuary.
In e w n t of hies. Trustor »IM»II give immediate notice (o Uenritoury. who may make \tnn*i of h#»s, and each insurance
company concerned is hereby suthortzed and J1 r e d e d to muko payment fur such lose directly 'o Beneficiary
tns4«*od \A iu l'rusiur JSM! Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance pruweds. <»r any tiart thereof, may \ta sppiicd
Uy Lionel usury, at its option, to reduction of Use* UMiebtednesa hereuy securvd or to the rvsturatum or repair of
Use) property dams fed.
X T o deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the Indebtedness secured hereby if paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abatracta of title or policies of title insurance and
any extensions or renewals thereof or auppiementa thereto.
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceedinc purporting to affect the security hereof*, (ho title to
ae»d property, or the right* or powers of Beneficiary or Truatee: and should Qeneficiary or Trustee fleet (a
alas) appear in or defend any such action or proceed ins*, lo pay ait coals and expenses, including cost of svtuessca oi title and attorney a lees in a reasonable sura incurred by Qeneficiary or Trustee.
5. T o pay at feast !0 day* before delinquency all taaea and assessments affecting said property, including
all asaessmsnts upon weter company stock and ail rents, assessment* and charges /or weter. appurtcnent to or
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due, ail encumbrances, charges, and liana with interest,
o n said property or any part thereof, which at any tune appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay ail costs,
fee*, and atpenaes of this Trust,
f. Should Trustor fail lo msuto any payment or to do any act aa herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trusts*, but without •obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without 'sieasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as aither may
deesss necessary lo protect the security Hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee: being authorised to enter upon said
property for such purposes: commence, sppear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to at feet the
security hereof or tho right* of power* of Beneficiary or Trustee: pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or hen which in tho judgment oi either appears (o be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liabdtty, • spend whatever amounts in it* absolute discretion it may deem
naceasary therefor, including cost oi evsdenca of* Utie, employ counsel, and pay hta reasonable iawa.
?. T o pay immediately and without demand ail rums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trust**,
w«u* interest from data oi expenditure s i tho rata oi ten par cent (10%) par annum until pasd, and tho repay*
axaaat thereof1 shall bo secured heresy.

IT 13 MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof bo taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proeeeJtng. or damaged by tire, or earthquake, or in any othr>r manner
lienettciary snail be
entitled to ail compensation, awards, snd other payment* or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at it* option
to commence. aptiear in and prosecute in it* own name, any action or proceedings, or to mske any Comoro*
mrso or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards damages, rignt*
of action and proceeds, inducting the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting laid property.
are )t«rehy assigned to Beneftcisry, woo may, aftsr deducting therefrom ail its rxpenses, including sttorney a fees.
apply the same un any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to rsecute such further assignment* of any
compensation, awerd. damages. and right* of action and proceeds as lieneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time- and from time to tune upon writtten request of Beneficiery, psyment of tls fees and prssentatton of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (tn case of fuil reconvevsnee. for canceilstion snd
retention), without sflectins; the liability of any person for (he psyment of the indebtednese secured hereoy
Trustee msy ( s i consent to the making oi sny man of plat of said property; (b) join in {ranting any rase*
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in sny subordination or other screement affecting this Trust Oe«d
or tho lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey. without warranty, sil or any pert of said oroperty The frantee in
any reconvavence msy be described aa Mho person or persons entitled thereto' and tha recitaia therein of any
matters or facts snail be conciuatve proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor sgrees to pay ressomtoie Trustees
fees for s a y of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiery. duruig the continusnce of these trust*, ail
rent*, issues, roysities, and prof its of tha property at f acted by thia Trust Deed and of sny personal property
located thereon. Untd Trustor thaU default in tha psyment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect ait such rent*, issues, roysities
snd profit* tsrnad prior to default aa they become due and payable
If Trustor ihsit default as aforesaid
Trustor s right to collect any of tuch moneye shall cease snd lleneliciery shall have the n«ht w*«h or without
taking poaeeeason of (he property aifected hereby, to collect ail rent*, roysities, issues, snd protils. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneiiciary at any time or from tuna to tune to collect any such moneys shad not us sny
manner «ff«ct {ha ««rba«q<rent •nforcrman* by Bener/cra/y oi >be» rtfhi, power, rod amhorny *o cuiiect iha> iw>»
Noshing contained herein, nor tha «xercis* of tha right by beneficiary to collect, thai! t*e or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneiiciary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumotion of liability under, nor •
awborduiatson of tha lien or charge of thus Trust Deed to s n y sucn tenancy, lease or option.
11.

Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiery m s y at any tuna without notice, fithcr in
by s receiver to bo sppointed by s court (Trustor hereby consenting to the sppointment o.
receiver>, and without regard to tha adequacy of sny security for the indebtedness hereby
ami tska possession of i s id property or any part thereof, in its own name sua for or
otharwtsa ruiiect tasd rent*, issues, at%*a profit* including those pset due and unoasd, and spply (ha tame, less
cueta ami eapenaee of ofieratton assd collection, including raaaonaliia attorney a fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and ba such order aa Beneficiary may drtormina.
by agent, or
eneficiary aa such
Barson,
secured, enter upon

12. T h e entering upon and taking pnaaaaainw of said property, tha coilecton of such rent*, issues, anc
profita. or the proceed* of firo and other insurance policies or compensation or swards for sny taking 01
damage oi tasd property, and the application or release thereof aa aforesaid, shsil not cure or wesve any
default or notsca of default hereunder or invalidate any set dona pursuant to such notice.
IX T h e failure on tha part of Beneficiary to promptly snforc* any right hereunder shsil not opereU aa waivar U such right anal tha waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute s waiver of any otl>*
or subsequent default.
14. Ttma is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor In tha payment of any indebtedness secured here
by or us the uerfurmonre of sny agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shsil immediaieiy become du«
and payjr.if at tha option of Benefioary in the event of such default Benviicury may cserme or cause Trusle*
In esevute s written nottte oi defeuit smi of elei tmn t b CJHSS* laid property to I*- v.hl to saiufy the obligation.
Isare*^. ami 1 ni.u-u kliall die tuvh ru^um f»»r rvcord in each muntv *h«r%in said property or some pert 0.
parcri thereof is **tisat«-i Ueneiniary MIM* siioil deposit wids Trustee. ih« note and all Ju«.um#nt* evidencing
SS|*en.iitur«.a secured ):«>.. 1 ) .

de/suit ami notice of default and notic* U « 1 « having b««n ftv«n as then required by taw Tfu»**«. without <
JA Trustor *h.*il >*»! t*u i |>*»*»>' ** ' on the daia ana at lhe time ana place J n i g
»«j in «uui nonce of (ate. either at
a whoi« or MI Mri»*»***ie D^ILL!..
n s u m order aa tt uiay a « u n i i t a « ( U u »ut*te
any statutory n«ui oi Tru»u>r U>
direct Ui« order in which •»»*:•
.operty. if consisting of sever.*! known lots
.»arrets. th^it lie ktmi), at puUic
auction to the highest bustler, the nurcit*** price u«yabi« in lawful ntoiivr of the Umtni States at the lime of
sale. Tl»e p e n o n conducting lhe aai* mar. (or any c a u s e he deems expvotent. poatiM>ne th« sale i r o n time to
tim* unld >( ahe.it be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be ftven by public declaration
thereof by such person at lite u m e and place last appointed (or lit* sale; provided, il the sale ts postponed
for tonctr than one day beyond the day designated in t h e notice oi sal*, noiica thereof thai I be given tn the
same manner as the original notice of talc. Trustee snail execute and deliver lo the purchaser its Dead con*
veying aari property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitsia in tha
D e e d oi any matters or facta snail be conciusiv* prooi of the truthfulness thereof. Any person. including Bene*
iiciary, may bid at th« sain. Trustee shall apply tha proceeds of lhe sale to payment of (1) the e o s u and
expanses ol exercising the power of aaie and of the sale, including tha payment of (he T r u s t e e s and attorney I
fees; (2) cost oi any evidence of Utie procured in connection with such aaie and revenue t>iamps on Trustees Deed;
(3) ail sums expended under tha terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10** omr annum from data
of expenditure: (4) all other sums then secured heresy, and (5) (he remainder, if sny. to the person or persons
let ally entitled thereto, or Ui* Trust**, ux its discretion, aaay deposst tha balance oi such proceeds with the County
Clerk of Lhe county m which tha sale too* place,
16. Upon tha occurrence at* any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall Have the option to. declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and fore d o e * this Trust Deed tn tha manner provided by law
for the foreclosure oT mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be enutled to recover in such proceed*
tag all costs and expanse* incident thereto, tacit*'
duding a raaaonaula attorney's fee tn such amount as shall be
fixed by tha court.
17. B a n e / k i a r y m a y appoint a successor trust** a t a n y time by filing for reeor 1 in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in wnich said property or s o m a part Ihereo/ is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
tha u m e tha substitution is filed for record, tha new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and tale of the trustee named herein or ol* s n y successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be esecuted and
acknowledged, and notice thereo** shall be ftven and prool thereof made, m the manner provided by law.
18. Tiiis Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to tha benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees.
devisees, admtnstrators, esecutors, successors snd assigns. Ail obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint Atui
several* T h e term "Ueneficiary" shall mean tha owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, wnenever tha context requires, tha masculine tender includes the feminine a n d / o r
neuter, and the singular number includes tha plural.
19. Trustee sccapts this Trust when this Trust D e e d , duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record aa provided by law. T r u s t s * is not obligated to notify s n y party hereto of pending sale under any other
T r u s t Deed or of any action or proceeding tn watch Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20.

T h i s Trust Dead

snail be construed

sccording to tha laws of tha Stat* of Utah

21. T h a undersigned Trustor requests that a c o p y at any notice oi default and ot* any notice of sale
hareunder be mailed to h i m at tha address hereinbefore sat forth.
Signature of Trustor

(If Tmator

STATE OF UTAH.
COUNTY OF ^ g "
On the .

Mn^S^tTx^^T^;

/—v

L(a^_d«yof_2^^,

_, AJ3. 19&JL, personally

appeared before me ~gi01«Jg«»JUati^^
,
the signers) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ..they., executed the
same.
Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Empires:
(If Trustor t Corporation)
STATE OF UTAUt
COUNTY 0F£*-**T
On the _

lla~-

appeared before me

day of
TESSES^B^XEOO^

-, AJ3.i.

19 JLLpersonally

... who being by me duly sworn,

taya that he is the
President.
of .^2ntazst2tfca-3eatala r .Jric^ r the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument waa
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authonty oi a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
KENNE^..£(•..
to me that said corporation executed the same.

My Commission Expires:

EXHIBIT *AW

Beginning at a point South 89* 43' 36" Waat along tha North
line of Lot 3, 175.42 feat from tha corner of Lota 1 and 8, a
brass cap set by tha U. S. General Land Office, said braaa cap
also being South 00* 19' 46" Weat along section line 1336.14
faet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence
South 89* 43# 36* Weat along the Morth line of Lota 7 and 8
2948.98 faet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South
00V13* 29" Saat along the Weat line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to
the Southweat corner of Lot 7; thenca North 89" 47* 41" Eaat
along tha South line of Lot 7, 832*67 feet; thenca North 61•
00« 00" Eaat 195i*.90 faet; thenca North 47* 33' 15" Eaat
462.75 feet; thenca North 42* 44' 40" Eaat 85.63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-W
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.
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cxacazad Sy JCHH C- SSXX? *ad ZZ3X1ZZXZ T. S2X&
lit«

(o*raia-

• S « i l * r * ) , *ad 323X37 m r C H , IZ23 3 - SAZSETaS,

CTHS3

X. SCSrCH, *ad ? A C 2 . XJWCSS ( a a x s i a a d t a r a s l i « c l i v a l ?

T i i J Memorsadsi l i c x a c n a d f a r ta« « » « * * ?ar?o*«
o i d a a e r i a i a g taa«* ^naa-sara «gra«d caca Sy ta« ? « r ^ « s hars-sa
v a i c a s u r ^ v c t=« d s s l a ? ad t a * t r a a a a c a i a a .
1-

Zz L* s u a s a l l y a<yr**d ind ^sdezs-caod Z2*z xr^sr

raearajrsiaa cd ; » • ?UD ?Lic tad ±a« 3 « c l a r a a i a a ad Cav«a*at3,
Canddaiaaj aad X a s a r i a a i a a * , *nd u s e s r a c s i s c o i «aci
514Q,oaQ.aO i a p r i a e i a * ! (baa nor i a d a d i a g ?a* €«aaasa aoaey
asd down payaaaa 3©a*y) , S*AI*r i h t l l «a»caa» i s d d«ll*r*x ta
3Txy«r t P a r t i a l D+md ad
2.

ftacarayiacs

f a r ea« (U ?T3 l a a .

Cpca ta*- payMa-c od t a * r a l a a a * p r i a a , ^ay*r iha 11

b* «ax±dl*d ta ta* r*laaa« od aa* CI) l e a od 3ny*r J * caoia* saaa
rmcaipa od t a * paytsaaa or t c any t i a * tacraadaar,.
3.

1* i a agr**d taaa* a t t a * ' t i s * c i •xacaaiaa ad

t n i i Jfcraeraadaa, 3ay*r i a * paid ta S e l l e r t s « s i s ad SSI2,aaa.a<3
vhica w i l l r e l e a s e i r a a ta* 2«*d a i ? r a « tar«* (2] ?ra I C ^ J Cpca t a * racarda^isa af ta« ?TS ? l a a md

3*ciaraa±aa a£ C s v « a a a a ,

rirnrtf.aiaM and 3 * a t r i c a i c a a v i t a ^ * S u = i s Caaaay aacardar,
3ay*r x a a l l be « a a i t l * d ta t a * r s l a a a * i r a a ta* 0«*d a i rraxa cd
tar** (3) ?€3 l a t a ad 3uy«r 4 « c a a i a * tr<?*aa*r vi^a ta* t a i d r a * d v*y.

0011

4*

2a the ereat Buyer sacald pay ta Seller any princi-

pal rai i s mxcm»M or* tha agreed tpca release prica, said so»
shall be applied toward tha n e « r a l * « M p r i c e , i . a . , should Bayer
aaxa a principal paymeat of 5160,1300.00. tha sua of' 520,000.00
(51£0;000.00 l a s s 5140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next
release prica which s h a l l repairs sa additional principal payaeat
Of 5120,000.00 (520,000.00 piss 5120,000.00 eqaaia

5140,000.00)

ta release the aaxa l o t .
5.

The praaoeed plat i s attached hereta as Sxhihit

•*• aad by t h i s rafaraaca iacarpcratad herein.

Seller heraay

acknowledges aad acraes ta execata aa a liaaholdar tha original
plat prior ta recardatioa.

Oaacas in tha prapoaad plat aad tha

Deciaratica of Coveaaats, Conditions aad Restrictions *n*n preparad shall ha lahjeca ta tha reascnaale approval of S e l l e r .
6.

Saliar &<??*** to grant ta Susosit Cnunty tha tan

aad one-half (10-1/2) fact strip of land outlined in rad oa
2xh±bit *\m.

Said eanveyaaca shall ba tar tha sola ?vr?omm of

vidaaiatj tha Cauaty roadway.
i a tha fara of aa easeaeat.

If p o s s i h i e , such grant shall ba
Tha Canary indicates that i t i s

possiale that tha Csaaty raad aa i t e x i s t s i s not whers i t i s
plattad.

2f sach 'pTS^mm ta ba a faca« Saliar aeraes that upon

prapar Tacatica, qnit c l a i a aad ahaadoasaat of tha plattad road
by tha Couaty, S e l l e r

MHAII

graat ta tha Caaaty fay way of

aasaaaat i f possible) tha Caaaty road aa i t i x i u j aa i t i s
shown oa Exhibit
7.

9 m

\ .

Buyer agrees to provide Saliar wi •-*. one (1) *mst*r

connection aad one (13 caiinary watar connection into Buyer's
syatsms at luch tiaa aa eacn i s available, and Sailer shall pay
a connection fee aad service fee equal ta the pro rata coat ta

tha ptirsa**«r of * loa in Buyer's proposed 7TJD piua 41x7 chargaa
o i ixaaaih Vafcar DiatrlSuxing Company*

Eb* wv«r and vatar

aaaaacaiaa graatad ahc*r« can b* naad by 3«Ilar in ae*r
ceaatmctioa iJf allowed on tha S«3 acra parcal or for coaaactiaa ta tha eais*iaq raaidaacsj or^Sailar,

Should Sallar ra^uira

another vatar and/or savar connection^ upon payment of 'the saoa
charge sat forth i n the prior santanca, i i v a i l and savar Una
c*4*aci*y la availaaia in Suyar'a syataax, and i i 3uy*r shall
convey to S e l l e r vhatavar vatar right* tna 3card of Health
vauid raquir* isr

en* (1] culinary connection (no* to « c a « a

ona aera/foot} Mild tna location of tna rsaidancaa to be locatad
oa tna retained apprcxiaataly 3,3 acra portion of S e l l e r 4 !
property snail a* suajecu to tna raaaonaala approval of Leon H*
Saunders and tna residences to be ccnatructad on tna MMld 3*5
•era parcal s h a l l be subject to tna saxna raatricticna «a 3uvar's
raaidancaa are subject to '>nidar the Covenants, Conditions and
Xaatrictiona oi Whita ?ina Han eh FTO, 3uyer shall gran* to
Seller another ona (1J culinary conn action and ona (13 itvar
caaaecaica..

I i S e l l e r doaa aou rec^ueaa tha sacond culinary

wauar connection and/or %m*mx connection. Sailer Is aot
subject to tha condition* s e t forth in tha iaaadiataly
praoadiac sentanca*

Tha location through 3uy*r's property

oi tha tmvmx lina and culinary vatar Una shall ba desiguatad
by 3uy«r sad 3uyer w i l l u x s such daaignaaioa to tha cioaaat
raaacnahia connection point to S e l l e r ' s property,
3,

3uyer and•Seller aqrs* tha* none of then nave en-

gaged a Seal I s t a t s 3rc**r, Agent or Finder for the purposes of
affacting this transaction and no ccaaission, fee or other conpansation shall be due and cvioc to any such 3roxer, Agent or
?iader MM a raault oi this cioainc.
9.

This Meacraadua and tha closing docuaenta exscatad

aiaultaneoualy haravita contain a l l tha understandings, varrantiaa.
•3-

rapraaaatatiooa aad i^rt«a«at2 aaon? tha partlaa 4nd taa
a n aatarad l a t a i f tar aaca parry tu* paracaally tad fully i a *wavt±gatad a l l facta aad eiraaaataacas caacaraiaa; taa traaaactifiaa raflactad by tad eoatasrpUtad aaraia tad aoaa of taa
paxtiaa asa ralyiao; \a?ca tay stataaaata or rapraaaatatiaaa aaa
•mhadimd aaraia.
10 •

Tlsa ia of taa mssmncn of tala Maaorandca aad

i t aay act b* o r a l l y caaagad. modified or tsraiaatad aaeapt-ia
>§riala«, aioaad by taa parry aaaiaat vnca taa saaa ia acnaat ta
ba aafaraad,

Taa tarss of tala Haaaraadaa shall apply ta tad

biad taa halra, a*acatara# ad=uaiatratara, sucssaaora tad
assign* of taa raspactiva ?*rti«a harata.
11-

l a t£a avast of braaca or default of tay oaiiga-

tioa aadar tala Meaoraadusu taa defauifcia? ?*2rZY saall pay All
expeases of enforcing taa saaa or tay right arising out of breach
*or da f a u l t thereof, including- rasscaaale tttaraeys* f e e s , whether
iacarrad with or without suit tad both before and aftar Jadcxaat.
12-

All warrantias, eaveaaats, obligation* and agree-

aanta csatalaad baxsla *hMll survive taa closing of tala transaction and aay aad a l l docnaeats aad laatranenta dalivarad ia
caaaactioa herewith tad snail raavala aiadlag upon taa paxtiaa
harata*
DASS3 tala \Uf

_ day of

-^

VJLA^

, 13*1.

i
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Tab 3

t

Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3513)
Kathy A. ?. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq." (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

.

»I

»

P 2 C 1553
C:sr-- :.-= !T:Sl. Court

Z

wsp-_r/ Clanc

Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
Utah general oartnerhiD;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES", a
Utah general partnersnip,

^ L OVA no. a<63^>

Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT

vs.
1

JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utan
corporation,

Civil No. C37-1S21
Jucce J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and RAUL H. LANDE3, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general oartnershio,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable I

J. Dennis Frederick on January 23, 1983 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1983 through March 25, 1938, with the defendants

John C.

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(hereinafter

|

the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted oro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

(hereinafter

"Saunders") ,

Robert

"Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Investment Corporation

appearing

by counsel Robert M. I

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gay lord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

I

("Norton") acoeared through his I

counsel John 3. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and i
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served

Counterclaim defendant Paul K. Landes (here- I

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
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j

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed, no cause of
action.
IT

IS' FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are indebted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following
amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

S

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

S

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$133.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:

$

1,803.80

Court Costs:

S

2,381.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

together with interest

thereon at the rate of 10% per

annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

together with interest and penalties assessed

20,368.62
thereon as

provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per

annum.

t *
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal,
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

Temporary Restraining
matter

Order

entered

AND DECREED

that the

in the above captioned

by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,

1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in the amount of 32,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of S23,570.63, and for which amounts the plaintiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject
premises•
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECF^ED that Lot 6 as
described

in the final recorded plat of White Pine Rancnes

Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be
sold at puolic auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the

manner prescribed by law for such sales; that

-4-
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I

said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his
costs,

disbursements

and

commission,

and

then

pay

to

the

Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs
of

this action, then said sums for the Sharps' attorneys1

fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes,
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for
and paid

over

to the Clerk of this Court subject to this

Court's further order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to re- I
deem the same within the time provided by law for such redemp- [
tion; that from and after the expiration of the period of redemption as provided by law, tha~ the plaintiffs aoove named, j
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the J
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the i
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises than the grantees named j
therein be given possession thereof.

I

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a
deficiency

results after due and proper

-5-

application of the

/ -*<< r^r^ \
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are heresy awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders,

Felton,

Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

that the

Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs* culinary water and sewer systems on
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000
each.
IT 13 FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonexclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and purchasers

thereof

(including the Sharps)

and

their invitees,

guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and
egress for vehicular and pedestrian

access

over, under

and

across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches

-6-
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine
Ranches Phase I.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the

final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Recorder's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff1s
Sale,

or

other

than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs

herein

a subsequent

coupled

with

redemption of the subject premises,

plaintiffs1

declaration

for

the

ex-

tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the
unplatted acreaoe.
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Beginning a t a point South *33 d e g r e e s 43*35* West along tha
Ncrth l i n e c i Let 3, 172*42 i a e t izrsa t i e corner oi Lct^s 1
and 3 , a brass cap s a t by tha U.S* Canarai Land Oiiica, s a i d
b r a s s cap a l s o being South 00 d e g r e e s 13 US* West along
s e c t i o n l i n e 1236.H f a e t i r e s t i e Northeast-comer oi
S e c t i o n 1, Tcvnship 2 South, Range 3 Zast, Salt Laia 3asa
and Meridian; and running thanca South 33 dagraas 43*36"
West aXcng t i e North l i n e o£ Lot 7 and 3 2343.33 faet t o tha
Northwest corner oi Lot 7; thenca South 00 dagraes 12*25"
l a s t along t i e West l i n e oi Lot 7, 1312.34 faat to t i ef • r f
S c u t h v a s t - c o m e r oi Lot 7; thence North 39 dagraes 47 41
l a s t along the Scutb l i n e oi Lot 7, 322.57 faec; tianca
North 61 decrees 00 '00" l a s t 1355.90 f a e t ; thenca North 47
d e tg r el ef s I S ' l i " Zasc 462.72 i a e t ; thanca North. 4 2 decraas
44 40
l a s t 3e.53 iaac to the peine ci beginning.
LZS3 and excepting Whits Pins 32nchss, 5h2se Z, a Planzsd Basicsntial
Eeveicpxe*rc, *<" •--"^^ to the official p l a t trsrscf en file and cf
rscord i n the Suznit Couafcv Heccrdar's Offica, Stscs of Utah.
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Tab 4

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM,

MAY 1 ** ""•

P.C.

175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: ' (301) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,

AMENDED
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO
INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND

Plaintiffs,
-vJOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
DefendantsJOHN C. SHARP, et al.
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C37-1521
-vJudge J. Dennis Frederick
RC3ERT FELTON, et al-,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

Defendants'

Second

Motion

to

Supplement

Judgment and

Motion to Increase Liability on 3ond came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick on Monday,
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.

The

Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and
Kathy A. F. Davis.

Plaintiffs were represented

by their

0024

counsel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord.

The Court, hav-

ing reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, having heard the arguments of counsel, having received the proffers of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing
therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded

plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or
before March 15, 1990.

If the plaintiffs fail to pay the

taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automatically vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein. Subsequent to the Court's ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Payment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated
February 22, 1990.
2.

The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26,

1988 is hereby supplemented through February 12, 1990 by the
amount of 3231,536.97 for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as
of February 12, 1990.

The supplementation includes the fol-

lowing amounts:
a.

Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-

curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plaintiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants'
-2-
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Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84,00?
"Tracy

Collins Appeal"

in the

amount

of $24,381.51

(for a

total of $24,938.89);
b.

The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment

from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the attorney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through
September 26, 1988 as follows:
(1) Principal from 3/22/88
to 9/26/88:
(2) Attorney's fees:
(3) Court costs:
(4) Trustee's fees:
TOTAL:
c.

$34,464.16
$ 5,800.77
$
249.63
$
230.93
$40,745.49

The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on

payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through February 12,
1990 as follows:
(1) Principal
($183.32 x 504 davs
9/26/88 - 2/12/901:
$ 92,393.28
(2) Attorney's fees:
Paid Prior to Judgment
(i) (Second Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom
9/27/88 - 10/31/89): $11,287,91
(ii) ($28.20 x 104 days
10/31/88 - 2/12/90): $ 2,932.80
Paid Post-Judgment
(9/26/88 - 2/12/90)
(i) (Third Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom
$5,446.29 - $1,781.26,
(interest backed out,
2/13/90 - 8/1/90,
169 days x $10.54): $ 3,665.03 $ 17,885.74
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(3) Court costs
($.79 x 504 days
9/26/88 - 2/12/90):
(4) Trustee's fees:
($.49 x 504 days
9/26/88 - 2/12/90)
TOTAL:
3.

$

398.16

$

246.96

$110,924.14

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17,

1989 is hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the following amounts:
a.

Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-

curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plaintiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants'
Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $34.00;
"Tracy

Collins

Appeal"

in the

amount

of $24,381.51

(for a

total of $24,938.89);
b.

The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment

from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the attorney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through
September 26, 1988 as follows:
(1) Principal from 3/22/88
to 9/26/88:
(2) Attorney's fees:
(3) Court costs:
(4) Trustee's fees:
TOTAL:
c.

334,464.J 6
S 5,300.77
S
249.63
S
230.93
340,745.49

The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on

payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment
-4-
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from the date thereof

(September 26, 1988) through August 1,

1990 as follows:
(1) Principal ($183.32 x
674 days):
(2) Attorney's fees:
Paid Prior to Judgment
(Second Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
($28.20 x 274 days)
Paid Post-Judgment
(Third Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
(3) Court costs ($.79 x
674 days):
(4) Trusteefs fees ($.49 x
674 days):

$123,557.68

$11,237.91
$ 7,726.80
$ 5,446.29

$ 24,461.00

TOTAL:
d.

$

532.46

$

330.26

$148,881.40

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in

the amount of $136,800.99, through August 1, 1990 ($976,009.98)
less the security thereon ($839,208.99).
sedeas

Bond

$79,793.36

awarding

a supersedeas

The Order Re: Super-

bond

(which was the anticipated

in

the

amount

of

interest accruing for

one year post-judgment), together with the Tracy Collins bond
in the amount of $28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6
and

the unplatted

secured

the

property valued at $728,445.00 previously

Judgment

in

the

amount

of

$839,208.99.

See

attached Exhibit "A," the Calculation of Supersedeas Bond.
4.

The

"Settlement,"

attorney's

fees

requested

with

in the amount of S473.78, and

regard

to

the

"Tracy Collins

Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Summary are taken under advisement.
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5.

Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as

a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated
March

17, '1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before

March 15, 1990-

If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15,

1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed
to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above
captioned matter.
DATED this

In

/Jlf^l

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

id.
'J.' DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of
the foregoing proposed AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY
ON BOND to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this Q Q,
day of April, 1990, to the following:
Stanford B. Owen, Esq.
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
Post Office Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Glen D. Watkins, Esq.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Post Office Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
David L. Gladwell
Chapter 7 Trustee
Post Office Box 3205
Ogden, Utah 84409
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EXHIBIT "A"
CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Trust Deed Note
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)

Principal
Interest - March 22, 1988
Interest ~ March 22, 1988 through
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days)
Late Payment Penalty
SUBTOTAL:

(e)

Post-Judgment Interest —
September 26, 1988 through
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days)
SUBTOTAL:

$371,739.35
171,033.54
34,464.16
14,869.57
$592,106.62

123,557.68
$715,664.30

Costs
(a)
(b)
(c)

Trustees Fees
$ 1,803.80
Court Costs
2,881.04
Attorney's Fees
(i)
Awarded in Judgment
144,088.75
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees
requested in Motion less fees in
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement
79,967.34
SUBTOTAL:

$228,740.93

interest
(a)
(b)
(c)

Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990
(S24,461.00 plus pre-judgment
interest of S5,800.77)
Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of S230.63)
Court costs to August 1, 1990
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of $249.63)
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$ 30,261.77
560.39
782.09

SUBTOTAL:

$ 31,604.75

TOTAL:

$976.009.98

CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
(Page 2)
Security

(a)
(b)
(c)

Lot 6 and Unplatted Property
Temporary Restraining Order Bonds
(i)* Cash Bond
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond
Supersedeas Bond

$728,445.00

TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond)

$839,208.99

2,400.00
28,570.63
79,793.36

Additional Security Necessary
(a) As of August 1, 1990
(b) LESS; Present Security

$976,009.98
839,208.99

ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED:
(With Tracy Collins Bond)

$136,800.99
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Tab 5

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
Suite 4004
175 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,
AFFIDAVIT OF
ALBERT D. NYSTROM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. ,
Defendants.

C i v i l No. C87-1621

JOHN C. SHARP, et al. ,
Judge J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k

Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, e t

al.,

Counterclaim-Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Albert D. Nystrom, after being first duly sworn, de
pose and say that:
1.

I am a licensed and certified public accountant i

the State of Utah.

0033

!
|
M
!
II

2.

Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court in the

above case, I have calculated interest on the principal from
March

22, 1988 to the date of the Judgment, September 26,

1988.

Such interest totals $34,464.16.

Interest continues to

accrue at a per diem rate of S183.32.
3.
to

Based upon the payments made by the Sharps pursuant

the Winder

& Haslam monthly billings

for legal services

attached to the affidavits filed with the Court, I have calculated interest on such legal fees at the Judgment rate of 10%
since

the

date

of

each

payment.

Such

interest

totals

S5,800.77 from date of expenditure to the date of Judgment:.
Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of S28.20 on
such legal fees.

Z have also calculated interest on such legal fees

4.
of

See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

522,400.00

which were paid

after

the date of Judgment,

Septemoer 26, 1988, to November 7, 1938.
diture

to September 26, 1990, the end of a two-year appeal

period, sucn interest totals S4,240.63.
accrue

From date of expen-

Interest continues to

after November 7, 1988 at a per diem rate of S6.14.

See Exhibit "3 M attached hereto.
5.

Based

Trustee's fees
calculated

upon

the payments made by the Sharps for

(see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp), I have

interest on such Trustee's

fees at the Judgment

rate of 10% per annum since the date of each payment.

Sucn

interest totals S230.93 from date of expenditure to the date

-2-
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of the Judgment.
rate of $.49.
6.

Interest continues to accrue at a per diem

See Exhibit "C" attached hereto.

Based upon payments made by the Sharps for Court

costs (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp and the affidavits
of attorney's fees filed with the Court), I have calculated
interest on such Court costs at the Judgment rate of 10% per
annum since payment.

Such interest totals S249.63 from date

of expenditure to the date of the Judgment.
tinues to accrue at a per diem rate of $.79.

Interest conSee Exhibit "D"

attached hereto.
7.

I have calculated the interest on the full Judgment

at the applicable rate provided in the Judgment, for an estimated two-year appeal period, from September 26, 1988 to Septemoer 26, 1990.

Such interest totals 5159,586.71.

There-

after, interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of
S218.94.
8.

See Exhibit "E" attached hereto.
Based upon the current rate for a six-month Treasury

Bill of 8.33%, I discounted the fair market value of the Property as found by the Court of S728,445.00 to its present value
assuming a one and one-half month foreclosure holding period
and a six-month selling period.

After the one and one-half

month foreclosure period, the present value of the Property
would be 5720,938.23 or $7,506.77 of lost value.

The present

value after a six-month selling period would be $699,318.39 or
S29,126.61 of lost value.

See Exhibit "F" attached hereto.
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r<& ""day of
DATED this *—*/

1988,

<£
Albert D. Nystrom
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b e f o r e me t h i s c£?-fA day of

D w w W r , 1988.

Zzzlrv*

it

NOTARY PUBLIC
sr
Residing in Salt Lake 6±ty,
Utah"

«•/

-

Ap.\2 2*. 1Cfc?2

ii

VKKY L. KSA'.Y

I)

173
173 Aes: 203 SS.BI

/|

dtssqigm -Expires:

'i
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EXHIBIT A
JOHN C. & GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DOE ON LEGAL FEES
PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM (For period from
date oaid to Seotemoer 26, 1988)

Date Paid
12/10/86
01/06/87
02/25/87
04/29/87
05/27/87
06/24/87
07/27/87
08/28/87
11/02/37
11/30/87
01/11/88
02/02/88
03/10/83
04/06/88
08/08/38

Amount
Paid
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$2,932.82
$1,467.30
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$3,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,500.00
$5,000.00
$25,126.99
$27,387.56
$25,000.00

Totals
as or
9/26/88: ;$102,914.67

Interest
Rate
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

Number of
days outstanding
to 9/26/88
656
629
579
516
438
460
427
395
329
301
259
237
200
173
49

Amount
of
Interest

Per Diem
Interest
Amtsunt

$ .41
259.59
253.49
$ .41
237.95
S .41
$ .80
414.61
196.13
$ .40
189.04
$ .41
175.43
S .41
$ .41
162.33
270.41
S .82
123.70
s .41
176.91
s .68
323.77
$1 .37
$1 ,373.06
$5 .83
$1 ,294.55
$7 .50
334.70
$6 .85
$
(rounding (50 .03)
ad iustment)

$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$5 ,800.77

$28 .20
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EXHIBIT B
JOHN C. & GERALDINS SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DOS ON LEGAL FEES
PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM AFTER JUDGMENT DATS
(For period from date oaid to September 26, 1990,
assumina two-year appeal oeriod)*

Data Paid

Amount
Paid

10/11/83
11/07/38

$2,400.00
320,000.00

Totals
as of
9/26/90:

S22,400.00

Interest
Rata
10%
10%

Number of
days outAmount
standing
of
to 9/26/90 Interssi
716
688

Per Diem
Interest
Amount

$ 470.79
$3,769.86

$ .66
$5.48

$4,240.65

$6.14

Calculation includes attorney's fees paid by John and
Geraldine Sharp through 11/07/88 only.
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EXHIBIT C
JOHN C AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON TRUSTEE'S FEES
AS OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1988

Date
Paid

Amount

Trustee'1 s Fees 1/23/87
Trustee'•s Fees 2/21/87
Trustee1's Fees 4/23/87
Trustee''s Fees 5/23/87
Trustee' s Fees 6/22/87
Trustee1's Fees 7/23/87
Trustee''s Fees 8/24/87
Trustee' s Fees 9/23/87
Trustee' s Fees 10/24/87
TOTALS

Number
of days
outstandAmount
Per
Interest ing to
of
diem
Rate
9/26/88 Interest Amount

200..00
200..00
200..00
200..00
200..00
200..00
200..00
200..00
203..80

10%
612
S33.53
10%
583
S31.95
10%
522
S28.60
10%
492
S26.96
10%
462
S25.32
10%
431
S23.62
10%
399
S21.36
10%
369
S20.22
10%
338
S18.87
(Rounding a d j u s t m e n t )

SI.803.80

S230.93

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.06
.03

S .49
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EXHIBIT D
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION1 OF INTERE2;T DUE ON COURT COSTS
ASi OF SEPTEMBER 26 , 1988

Date
Paid
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court
Court

Amount

Costs 9/13/86
S441.20
Costs 4/29/87
S 50.00
Costs 6/05/87
S351.40
Costs 12/02/87
3161.90
Costs 1/08/88
S129.00
Costs 2/09/88
S 94.20
Costs 2/10/88
S110.85
Costs 3/14/88
S195.00
Costs 4/06/88 31,277.49
Costs 9/08/83
S 70.00

TOTALS

0040

S2.881.04

Number
of days
outstandAmount
of
Iriteresit ina to
Rate
9/26/88 Interest
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

744
516
479
299
262
230
229
196
173
18

S89.93
S 7.07
S46.12
S13.26
S 9.23
S 5.92
S 6.94
S10.44
S60.38
S .34
3249.63

EXHIBIT E
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE FOR A TWO-YEAR
APPEAL PERIOD, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 to
SEPTEMBER 26, 1990 ON THE REMAINING PRINCIPAL BALANCE
OF THE PARK CITY LAND SALE CONTRACT,
ATTORNEY FEES PAID BY JOHN & GERALDINE SHARP*,
COURT COSTS AND TRUSTEE'S FEES

DescriDtion

Balance

Remaining balance $371,739.35
of the Park City
land sale contract

Interest
Rate

Amount of
Interest for
the Two-Year
ADDeal Period

Per Diem

18%

S133,826.16

$183.32

$102,914.67

10%

S 20,582.94

$ 28.20

$ 22,400.00

10%

S

4,240.65

$

6.14

Court costs

S

2,881.04

10%

S

576.20

$

.79

Trustee's fees

$

1,803.80

10%

S

360.76

$

.49

Attorney's fees
paid by John C &
Geraldine Sharp
As of 9/26/88:
From 9/26/88
to 11/07/88:

Total Interest for a two-year appeal period:
S159.586.71
Total Per Diem Rate as of 11/7/88:

*

S218.94

Calculation includes attorney's fees paid by John and
Geraldine Sharp through 11/7/88 only.
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EXHIBIT F
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF S728,445.00
FOR A ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTH AND SIX MONTH PERIOD
AT THE INTEREST RATE OF 8.3 3%
Present Value
One and One-Half Month Period
Question:
What amount ( t h e " P r e s e n t V a l u e Amount") i n v e s t e d a t 8.33%
would e q u a l S 7 2 8 . 4 4 5 . 0 0 45 d a y s from t o d a y ?
Solution:
I n t e r e s t R a t e f o r 45 Day P e r i o d :
(45/360)

(.0833)

= .0104125

The P r e s e n t V a l u e Amount:
S723,445.00

1.0104125

=

5720,938.23

Proof:
Interest

for

(S720,933.23)

45 D a y s :
(.0833)

(45/360)

=

$7,506.77

Add! the Present Value Amount:

3720,933.23

TOTAL:

728.445.00
Present Value
Six Month Period

Question:
What amount (the "Present Value Amount") invested at 8.33%
would equal 5728,445.00 six months from today?
Solution:
Interest Rate for Six Month Period:
(6/12) (.0833) = .04165

0042

The Present Value Amount:
$728,445.00

1.04165

=

5699.318.39

Proof;

Interest for six Montns:
(5699,318.39) (.0833) (6/12) =

S 29,126.61

Add Present Value Amount:

S699.318.39

TOTAL:

$728.445.00
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Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
ALBERT D. NYSTROM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. C37-1621
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, et al.,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

I, Albert D. Nystrom, after being first duly sworn, depose and say that:
1.

I am a licensed and certified public accounrant in

the State of Utah.

2.

Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court: in the i

above case, I have calculated interest on the principal from

j

j

i

March 23, 1988 to October 31, 1989.
I $107,792.16.

Such interest totals I

Interest accrued at a per diem rate of $183.32. |

! See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

,

i

3.
I have also calculated interest on the principal
II from September 26, 1988, the date Judgment was entered by this
!

M

Jj Court, to October 31, 1989. Such interest totals $73,328.00. «
i Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of $183.32.

i|
,j See also Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

j

'i

!«

4.

Based upon the payments prior to the date of Judg-

|l

!

| J ment, September 26, 1988, made by the Sharps pursuant to the
!

!

j Winder & Haslam monthly billings for legal services attached

!

J to the affidavits filed with the Court, I have calculated in- ;
I terest on such legal fees at the Judgment rate of 10% since I
N

.

u the date of each payment.

!

Such interest totals $17,088.68

i
<

,
t
i

! from date of expenditure to October 31, 1989.
ber 27, 1988
I $11,287.91.

to

October

31, 1989,

interest

totals

Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate

of $28.20 on such legal fees.
to.

such

From Septem-

See Exhibit "B" attached here-

Compare Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19,

1988 ("First Affidavit"), paragraph 3.
5.

I have also calculated interest on such legal fees

,
i

of $63,403.50 which were paid after the date of Judgment, SepI j

i

i tember 26, 1988 to October 31, 1989 at the Judgment rate of i

I

j

! 10% since the date of each payment.
I
'!
i

:!
,;

From date of expenditure
~
»

-2-
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11

i;
i
!

• to October 31, 1989, such interest totals $3,619.73.
J continues

to accrue after

Interest

October 31, 1989 at a per diem race

of $17.37. See Exhibit "C" attached hereto.
j

6.

Based upon the payments made by the Sharps for

i!

I Trustee's fees (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp), I have

\i

lj calculated interest on such Trustee's fees at the Judgment:
i1 rate of 10% per annum since the date of each payment to Octo.I
jl ber 31, 1989. Such interest totals $428.60 from date of exi •

t

, penditure to October 31, 1989. From September 27, 1988 to

li
;, October 31, 1989, such interest totals $197.67. Interest ccni\

, tinues to accrue at a per diem rate of $,49.
(( attached hereto.
1 .

I

See Exhibit '"D"

Compare First Affidavit, paragraph 5.

Based upon payments made by the Sharps for Court

jj costs (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp and the affidavits
j| of attorney's fees filed with the Court), I have calculated
\ interest on such Court costs at the Judgment rate of 10% per
annum since the date of each payment to October 31,

1989.

Such interest totals $565.63 from date of expenditure to October 31, 1989. From September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989,
such interest totals $316.00.
a per diem rate of $.79.

Interest continues to accrue at

See Exhibit "E" attached here:o.

Compare First Affidavit, paragraph 6.
8.

I have attached a summarization of the interest and

late payment charges on the full Judgment (excluding amounts
paid by Plaintiffs for property taxes owed on the property at
issue) at the applicable rates provided in the Judgment for

0046
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the period ended October 31, 1989 of $315,397.91 with interest
j for the period September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989 totalj! ling $88,749.31.

For the period November 1, 1989 to Sep-

ii

| tember 26, 1990, assuming a further one year appeal period,
!

| interest would total $75,956.10 for a combined total at Sep: tember 26, 1990 of $391,354.01.

See Exhibits "F" and "G" at-

tached hereto and First Affidavit,
,
DATED this
* — day of /$je~c<*M*4>*lJ

1989.

^&*-t~l)~
Albert D. Nystrom
A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8^)

LkdtjJ^x

day of

, 1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City,
Utah
My Commission Expires

-4-
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EXHIBIT A
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL
For the Period March 23, 1988 to October 31, 1989

Principal
$371,739.35

Interest
rate

Number
of
days

18%

588

Per diem
interest
amount

Amount
of
interest

$ 183.32 5107,792.16

JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL
For the Period September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989

Principal
$371,739.35

0048

Interest
rate

Number
of
days

Per diem
interest
amount

Amount
of
interest

13%

400

$ 183.32

$73,328.00

EXHIBIT B
JOHN C. & GERALD INE SHARP

CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM
PRIOR TO JUDGMENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
For the oeriod from dare paid to Ocrober 31, 1989

Date Paid
12/10/86
1/6/87
2/25/87
4/29/87
5/27/87
6/24/87
7/27/87
8/28/87
11/2/87
11/30/87
1/11/88
2/2/88
3/10/88
4/6/88
8/8/88

Amount
Paid
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$2,932.82
$1,467.30
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$3,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,500.00
$5,000.00
$25,126.99
$27,387.56
$25,000.00

Interest
Rate
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

1056
1029
979
916
888
860
827
795
729
701
659
637
600
573
449

Totals
as of
10/31/89: 5102,914.67

9/27/88 - 10/31/89

Per Diem
Amount

433.97
422.88
402.33
736.01
356.98
353.42
339.86
326.71
599.18
288.08
451.37
872.60
$4 ,130.47
$4 ,299.48
$1 ,075.34
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$17 ,088.68

Date Paid - 9/26/88
TOTAL

Amount
of
Interest

Number of
days to
10/31/89

$28.20

<$5,,800.77>*
:$11.,287.91

Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 1988.
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EXHIBIT C
JOHN C. & GERALDINE SHARP

CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES PAID TO WINDER S HASLAM
AFTER JUDGMENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
For the oeriod from dace paid to Ocrooer 31, 1989

Date Paid
10/11/88
11/7/83
12/19/88
1/19/89
2/17/89
3/17/89
4/17/89
5/15/89
6/14/89
6/21/89
7/13/89
8/16/89
9/20/89
10/16/89

Amount
Paid
$ 2,400.00
$20,000.00
$ 1,167.00
$ 1,167.00
$ 1,167.00
$ 1,167.00
$ 1,167.00
$10,000.00
$ 1,167.00
$
500.00
$ 1,167.00
$20,000.00
$ 1,167.50
$ 1,167.00

Totals
as or
10/31/89: $63,403.50

0050

Interest
Rate
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

Number of
days to
10/31/89
385
358
316
285
256
228
197
169
139
132
110
76
41
15

Amount
of
Interest

Per Diem
Amount

253.15
$1 ,961.64
101.03
$
91.12
$
8L.85
$
72.90
$
62.99
$
463.01
$
44.44
$
18.08
$
35.17
$
416.44
$
13.11
$
4.80
$_
$

<LJ.,619.73

$17.37

EXHIBIT D
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON TRUSTEE'S F5:ES
For the Period from Date Paid to October 31, 1989

Date
Paid

Amount

Interest
Rate

1/23/87
2/21/87
4/23/87
5/23/87
6/22/87
7/23/87
8/24/87
9/23/87
10/24/87

200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
200.00
203.80

10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

Totals
as of
10/31/89

51,803.80

Number of Amount
days tc)
Of
10/31/89 Interest
1012
983
922
892
862
831
799
769
738

TOTAL

$55.45
$53.86
$50.52
$48.88
$47.23
$45.53
$43.78
$42.14
$41.21

$428.60
Date Paid- 9/26/88
9/27/88 - 10/31/89

Per
diem
Amount

$ .49

<$230.93>*
$197^67

Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 1988.
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EXHIBIT E
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON COURT COSTS
For the Period from Data Paid to Ocrober 31, 1989

Date
Paid

Amount

9/13/86
$441.20
4/29/87
$ 50.00
6/05/87
$351.40
12/02/87
$161.90
1/08/88
$129.00
2/09/88
$ 94.20
2/10/88
$110.85
3/14/88
$195.00
4/06/88 $1,277.49
9/08/88
$ 70.00
TOTALS

$2,881.04

Interest
Rate
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%

Number• O f
days to
10/31/89
1144
916
879
699
662
630
629
596
573
418

Amount
of
Interest

Per
diem
Amount

$138.28
$12.55
$34.62
$31.00
$23.40
$16.26
$19.11
$31.84
$200.55
$ 8.02

$__.79

$565.63

.79

Date Paid - 9/26/88 <$249.63>*
TOTAL

9/27/88 - 10/31/89 $316.00

Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 1988.
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EXHIBIT F
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
SUMMARIZATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL TO OCTOBER 31, 1989
AND INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT
COSTS TO OCTOBER 31, 1989, AND THE INTEREST DUE ON THE
PRINCIPAL, LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT COSTS FOR
THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 1989 TO SEPTEMBER 26, 1990
(Assuming a Two Year Appeal Period)
Total
Amount

Description

Interest and
late payment
charges

Interest
Rate

Remaining balance $371,739*35
of the Park City
land sale contract

Per Diem
amount

18%

$183*32

Interest through
March 22, 1988 per
the Judgment

$171,033*54

Late payment charges
per the Judgment

$ 14,869*57

Interest for the
March 23, 1988 to
October 31, 1989

$107,792,16

Total

$293,695*27

Legal fees paid
$102,914*67
prior to the
Judgment: dare of
September 26, 1988

10%

$ 17,088.68

28*20

Legal fees paid
afrer the
Judgment date to
Ocrober 31, 1989

$ 63,403.50

10%

$ 3,619.73

17.37

Trustee's fees

$

1,803.80

10%

$

428.60

$

.49

Court costs

$

2,881.04

10%

$

565.63

$

.79

Total as of October 31, 1989

3315,397.91

$230.17

Add interest for the period
November 1, 1989 to September 26, 1990,
assuming a two year appeal period:
330 days at the per diem
rare of 210.17
Total as of September 26, 1990

$ 75,956.10
S391.354.01
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EXHIBIT G
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP
SUMMARIZATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL
SEPTEMBER 27, 1988 TO OCTOBER 31, 1989 AND
INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT COSTS
SEPTEMBER 27, 1988 TO OCTOBER 31, 1989
Total
Amount

Description

Interest
Rate

Principal 9/27/88 $371,739.35

Per Diem
amount

Interest

18%

$ 73,328.00

$183.32

Legal fees paid
$102,914.67
prior to the
Judgment date of
September 26, 1988

10%

$ 11,287.91

28.20

Legal fees paid
after the
Judgment date to
October 31, 1989

$ 63,403.50

10%

$

17.37

Trustee's fees

$

1,803.80

10%

$

197.67

$

.49

Court costs

$

2,881.04

10%

$

316.00

$

.79

to October 31, 1989

, 19881989:
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3,619.73

$88,749.31

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attornevs for Defendants Sharo

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:

JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

JOHN C. SHARP, et al. ,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:
:

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF
ALBERT D. NYSTROM

Civil No. C37-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

jiROBERT FELTON, e t a l . ,

:

!|

:

Counterclaim-Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Albert D. Nvstrom, after being first duly sworn, depose and say that:

0055

1.

I am a licensed and certified public accountant in

the State of Utah.
2.

I have allocated the legal fees paid after the date

of the Judgment, September 26, 1988, first to the amounts disallowed or taken under advisement by the Court (in the total
amount of $24,938.39) and then to those amounts allowed by the ,
Court.

Compare, Second Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom ("Sec- I

ond Affidavit"), paragraph 5.
3.

Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court in the

above case and the above allocation, I have recalculated interest on the legal fees of $38,464.61 which were paid after
the date of Judgment, September 26, 1988, through August 1,
1990 at the Judgment rate of 1Q% since the date of each payment.

From date of expenditure to August 1, 1990, such inter-

est totals $5,446.29.

Interest continues to accrue after

August 1, 1990 at a per diem rate of $10.54.
Affidavit, paragraph 5.

-2-
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Compare, Second

DATED t h i s

7th

day of

March

, 1990,

J£Lbert D. Nystrom
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ItL
^y/\a^L
, 1990.

J\
if

i« 1 -

^

^

§

V
«y
CemmUsion
Sapif»a Aprtl 23.1992

V

'CSY >_ HSAi,Y

"~

"

day of _

Notary Public Residingrin
S a l t Lake City, Utah
M

-3-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JULi2i390

ooOoo
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton,
Felton, Saunders Land Investment
Corporation, a Utah corporation;
White Pine Ranches, a Utah general
partnership; and White Pine
Enterprises, a Utah general
partnership,

C x x Of •*• Court

ORDER
Case No- 880710-CA
Case No. 880711-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y,
Sharp,
Defendants and Appellees.
and
Commissioner of Financial
Institutions, Receiver for
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust
Company,
Surety and Appellant.

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davidson (on Law and Motion).
This court having issued its remittitur and lacking
jurisdiction to further consider the appeal, appellants' Motion for
Stay of Remittitur Pending Review and For Approval of Supersedeas
Bond is hereby DENIED.
DATED this //

day of July, 1990.

FOR THE COURT:

y^<

y ^

7^t2<*^yy.

s

r^y
_^>y>^c<^<^^

p
I

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge '
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
VJHITE PINE RANCHES
PLAINTIFF
VS
SHARP, JOHN C.

CASE NUMBER 870901621 CV
DATE 08/01/90
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK JAB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION FOR DECISION DATED JUY 30, 1990 THE
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN C. BROWN
IS GRANTED.
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR STAY OF REMITTITUR AND JUDGMENT
PENDINGS REVIEW AND FOR APPROVAL OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS DENIED
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION THERETO.
3. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR HEARING IS DENIED AS UNTIMELY
PER RULE 4-501(3)(F) C.J.A.
4. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.

0059

Tab 7

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT FELTON;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP.,
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE
RANCHES, a Utah general
partnership; WHITE PINE
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general
partnership; and KENNETH R. NORTON,
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc., a
Nevada corporation,

Petition No. 900360

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALD INE Y.
SHARP,
Defendants and Respondents.
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Robert M. Anderson, Esq. (0108)
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (3397)
Bruce Wycoff, Esq. (4448)
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018
Telephone: (801) 532-1700
Attorneys for Appellants Leon H.
Saunders; Robert Felton; Saunders
Land Investment; White Pine Ranches
and White Pine Enterprises
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathv A.F. Davis, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, #4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for John C. and
Geraldine Y. Sharp

John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
Attorneys for Appellant Kenneth R.
Norton dba Interstate Rentalsf Inc.
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Pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 36(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellants, Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, Saunders
Land Investment, White Pine Ranches,

White Pine Enterprises and

Kenneth R. Norton (collectively "White Pine") respectfully move
this Court for a stay pending action by this Court on White Pine's
Petition for Certiorari.

As shown below, White Pine has first

requested this stay and a hearing on a supersedeas bond from both
the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

Both of those courts

have denied that request.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A*

Facts Giving Rise to the Controversy. Basically, this Appeal

involves the respective rights of the parties to approximately 38
acres of land in Summit County, Utah.

The factual background of

this case is generally set forth in the recent Opinion of the Court
of'Appeals reported at 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (May 25, 1990) (A copy
of that Opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit T ) . As a result
of a bench trial, defendants received a judgment entitling them to
foreclose and sell certain portions of real property developed in
Summit County by White Pine, consisting of Lot 6 of the White Pine
Ranches Subdivision and approxiiriately 27 acres of unplatted but
improved

real

property

adjacent

"Property").

2
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to

that

subdivision

(the

In connection with their Complaint, White Pine requested a
temporary restraining order enjoining a trustee's sale of the
Property as well as the internal roadway serving the White Pine
Subdivision.

The trial court conditioned the issuance of that

restraining order upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of
$2,400.00.

Thereafter, upon the parties' stipulation to an

injunction pending trial, the trial court imposed a $50,000.00
injunction bond, which remained in place until the trial was
concluded.
B.

Outcome of the Trial. A bench trial occurred on January 28-29

and March 22-25, 1988.

The trial court generally found in favor

of Defendants/Respondents (the "Sharps"). Once all relevant posttrial motions had been disposed of, White Pine filed its appeal,
which was decided in the Sharps' favor in the Court of Appeals on
May 25, 1990.
C«

The Initial Supersedeas Bond. The September 26, 1988 Judgment

calculated

White

Pine's

liability

to

the

Sharps

to

total

$759,415.63, inclusive of accrued interest, attorneys' fees, costs
and taxes.

The Court ruled the fair market value of the real

property foreclosed was $728,445.00.

Accordingly, the Judgment

awarded the Sharps $30,970.63 against the bond already posted.
On December 16, 1988 White Pine moved the trial court for a
stay of the judgment pending appeal and for approval of supersedeas
3
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bond in the amount of $65,158•77, which included the shortfall
calculated in the 'judgment, along with interest through June 30,
1989. The Sharps opposed that motion, arguing the supersedeas bond
should be $310,287.13.

On January 20, 1989 White Pine posted a

supersedeas bond in the amount of $79,793.36 pursuant to the trial
court's order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
D.

Events Giving Rise to This Request.

On November 1, 1989, in

accordance with para. 3 of the March 17, 1989 Order permitting Lot
1 to be used as security for increases, if any, in the supersedeas
bond amount, the Sharps filed their Request for Hearing on (1) a
previously filed Motion to Supplement Judgment; (2) their request
for additional attorneys' fees; and (3) their request for an
increase in the supersedeas bond amount.

A copy of that Request

is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". On December 6, 1989, the Sharps
filed their Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to
Increase Liability on Bond, in which the Sharps again requested,
inter alia, the trial court increase the amount of the supersedeas
bond.

A copy of that Second Motion

is attached

hereto as

Exhibit "D". At no time did the Sharps request the trial court to
order White Pine to post additional, or different, security.

At

the conclusion of the February 12, 1990 hearing on that Motion,
the trial court granted the Sharps' Motion "as prayed".

4
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See,

February 12, 1990 Minute Entry, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "E".
When the Sharps finally presented their proposed Order on the
Sharps' Second Motion to White Pine's counsel, however, the Order
said nothing about increasing the amount of the supersedeas bond;
instead it required White Pine Mto post additional security" in
the amount of $136,800,99 on or before March 15, 1990- That Order
on the Sharps' Second Motion was entered on March 16, 1990, the
same day White Pine filed its objections to the Order. A copy of
that March 16, 1990 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"
That Order further vacated the trial court's March 17, 198^
Order Staying Proceedings if such additional security was not
posted by March 15, 1990,
effect

vacated

before

In other words, the prior stay was in

the

order

vacating

it

was

entered.

Furthermore, the Sharps never requested that the stay be vacated
and that issue was neither raised nor ruled on at the February 12,
1990 hearing.1
E.

White Pine's First Request For A Stay In the Trial Court. On

March 16, 1990, White Pine filed its Motions for Continuance of
Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal and Approval
of Supersedeas Bond.

A copy of that pleading is attached hereto

1

The propriety of these actions is currently before the
Utah Court of Appeals in a second appeal, designated No. 900332-CA.

5

as Exhibit "G".
theretofore

As set forth in that Motion, the surety had

filed a financial statement with the trial court

indicating that the net worth of the surety in March, 1989 totaled
$220,000.00, more than the sum of the initial shortfall calculated
in the Judgment and the increase ordered by the trial court. That
$220,000.00 figure represents the value of Lot 1.

Accordingly,

White Pine requested the trial court enter an Order (1) staying
enforcement of the judgment pending final determination by the
Court of Appeals; and (2) declaring that the existing security be
considered adequate, and in full compliance with the Judgment and
stay.
On April 30, 1990, six weeks after that Order had been
entered, the Sharps filed their memorandum in opposition to that
Motion and, for the first time, objected to the sufficiency of the
bond. A copy of that objection is attached hereto as Exhibit "H"•
On May 7, 1990, White Pine filed its reply, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "I", (1) pointing out that the Sharps
never objected to the sufficiency of the bond until April 30, 1990,
and (2) requesting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
real property presently posted as security was sufficient security
pending appeal.
White Pine further demonstrated in Exhibit "I" that the Sharps
were merely re-litigating arguments they had already made in their
6
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January 1989 objection to the initial bond.

As pointed out in

White Pine's reply, "the form and nature of the security has been
approved by the Court, and its acceptability is now the law of the
case.

The only issue remaining is whether the security is

sufficient to guarantee the payment of unsecured fees, costs and
interest, which the Court has found to be $216,594.34 as of
August 1, 1990."

On May 7, 1990, White Pine also filed its Notice

to Submit that motion for decision.

The trial court denied White

Pine's Motion in its June 22, 1990 Order, without ever holding a
hearing. A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit
W

JM.

P.

White Pine's First Request For a Stay in the Court of Appeals.

Before then, however, on June 5, 1990, White Pine received the
trial Court's Minute Entry denying its motion.

Accordingly, on

June 6, 1990, White Pine filed its Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
and for Approval of Supersedeas Bond and supporting Memorandum with
the Court of Appeals.
exhibits —

A copy of that memorandum —

without

is attached hereto as Exhibit "K. " On June 15, 1990,

White Pine also filed its Petition for Rehearing on the Court of
Appeals' May 25, 1990 Opinion. The Court of Appeals never reached
the merits of White Pine's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, however.
Instead,

in

its

June

26, 1990 Order

Denying

Rehearing and

Remittitur, the Court of Appeals (1) denied White Pine's Petition
7

0066

for Rehearing; (2) granted a temporary stay for 30 days of all
further proceedings in the district court; (3) immediately remitted
the matter to the trial court; and (4) denied White Pine's Motion
for a Supersedeas Bond as moot. A copy of that Order is attached
hereto as Exhibit "L".
G

-

White Pine's Second Request for a Stay in the Court of

Appeals.

After studying Utah R. App. P. 36(b), and going so far

as to discuss the meaning of that Rule with the Chairman of the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, White Pine filed its Motion
for Stay of Remittitur and Judgment Pending Review, and for
Approval of Supersedeas Bond with both the Court of Appeals and the
trial court, on July 12, 1990. Copies of the memoranda supporting
those two motions are attached hereto as Exhibits "M" and "N"
respectively.

In connection with those two motions, counsel for

White Pine sent a letter explaining the dual

filing to the

presiding judge of the Court of Appeals, with a copy to the trial
court judge. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit
"0" .
H.

The Court of Appeals' Action on White Pine's Second Request

for a Stay,

On July 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied White

Pine's request on the grounds it lacked jurisdiction to further
consider the appeal.

A copy of that July 18, 1990 Order is

attached hereto as Exhibit "P".
8
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I.

The Trial Court's Action on White Pine's Second Request for

a Stay. On August-2, 1990, the trial judge's clerk advised counsel
for White Pine that the trial court had denied White Pine's motion
for a stay and its request for a hearing. See Affidavit of Glen D.
Watkins, dated August 2, 1990, filed herewith.

Contrary to that

decision, White Pine was entitled to a stay as a matter of right
and to a hearing due to the dispositive effect of the trial court's
denial of White Pine's Motion.
II.

NECESSITY FOR STAY

When the temporary stay granted by the Court of Appeals lapsed
on

July

26, 1990, the Sharps became

Property.

free to

foreclose the

Accordingly, on July 26, 1990, counsel for the Sharps

wrote the Summit County Sheriff requesting him to sell the Property
as soon as possible. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as
Exhibit

"Q M .

In a telephone conversation, the Summit County

Sheriff's Office advised White Pine's counsel that the sale is
scheduled for August 27, 1990. See, para. 4, Affidavit of Glen D.
Watkins.
If the requested stay is not granted, the property will be
subject to sale, and perhaps sold, before this Court has had an
opportunity to consider White Pine's Petition for Certiorari and
the Sharps' response.

In a case such as this, there is a

"particular danger of dismissal for mootness, and thus a special
9
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x*eed for seeking a stay [in the appellate court] when the district
court refuses to enjoin an impending sale of property."

See 9 J.

Moore, B. Ward Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) para. 208.03 at
pp. 8-11.
III.
A.

REASONS WHY A STAY SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE.

White Pine is Entitled to a Stay as of Right.

Under Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure 8(a) and 36(b), an appellant may apply
to the Supreme Court for a stay of the judgment after such relief
has been denied by an inferior court.

See Jensen v. Schwendiman,

744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987) (interpreting former Utah R.
Ct. App. 8). In ruling upon a Rule 8 motion, the appellate court
applies the same standard trial courts apply in motions brought
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62.

Xd.

"Thus, a money

judgment will be stayed as a matter of right upon posting a
supersedeas

bond."

Id.

(emphasis

added),

citing

American

Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting - Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 385 U.S. 931 (1966) (interpreting substantially
similar federal rules). Nevertheless, on four separate occasions,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals have denied White Pine's
Motions

for Stay despite White Pine's willingness

to post a

supersedeas bond.
If this Court does not grant a stay pending its action on
White Pine's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, White Pine will be
10
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irreparably harmed and White Pine's Petition for Certiorari will
be rendered moot. ; The judgment in this case is for slightly less
than One Million Dollars.

If a stay is not granted, a million

dollar issue will have been decided, as pointed out in White Pine's
Petition for Certiorari, without any appellate court review of the
merits of that judgment.
On the other hand, the stay sought by White Pine will have
little effect, if any, on the Sharps.

Their brief in reply to

White Pine's Petition is due on August 27, 1990, the very date of
the sale.

Once their brief has been filed, Rule 50(e), Utah R.

App.

provides

P.,

that

this

Court

will

immediately

begin

consideration of the Petition. White Pine now requests a stay only
until that determination is made. If this Court denies certiorari,
White Pine's appellate rights are extinguished, and no further
basis exists for a stay.

On the other hand, if White Pine's

Petition is granted, it then would be appropriate for White Pine
to petition this Court for approval of a supersedeas bond to
protect the Sharps during the pendency of the briefing, argument
and decision-making process. White Pine stands ready, and at all
material times has stood ready, to post such a bond, but no court
has addressed the amount and form of such a bond.
Although White Pine does not know the amount of time typically
taken by this Court to act upon a Petition for Certiorari, it
11

believes such a decision may be made by October 1, 1990.

This

slight delay in the scheduled sale causes no prejudice to the
Sharps compared to the devastating effect of the Sharps' execution
on a million dollar judgment against White Pine and the resulting
mooting of White Pine's appeal without any appellate review.
This result is especially tragic in light of refusals by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals on four different occasions
to grant White Pine a hearing on a bond White Pine has been trying
to post for five months.
IX.

CONCLUSION

White Pine has attempted for the past five months to post a
supersedeas bond in this case if a court would only hold a hearing
in this matter and determine the amount. Because of these refusals
by the

lower courts to hold

such a hearing,

it has become

essentially impossible for White Pine to post a supersedeas bond
before the scheduled August 27, 1990 Sheriff's Sale of the property
at issue in this case. White Pine is therefore forced to make its
present motion that this Court issue a stay of execution in this
case until such time as it acts on White Pine's Petition for
Certiorari.

The stay will not hurt the Sharps and will prevent a

severe injustice.

12
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DATED: August 2, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDERSON & WATKINS

&UUL
Robert M. Ande^
Glen D. Watkir
Bruce Wycoff
Attorneys for Appellants Leon H. Saunders;
Robert Felton; Saunders Land Investment;
White Pine Ranches and White Pine
Enterprises

<UJUL

£• fadiMm /fir

John B. Anderson
/
Attorney for Kenneth R* Norton,
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc.
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Tab 8

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
AUGUST 14, 1990
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq*
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, #4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 85110.

Leon H. Saunders; Robert Felton;
Saunders Land Investment Corp.,
a Utah corporation; White Pines Ranches,
a Utah General partnership; White Pine
Enterprises, a Utah general
partnership; and Kenneth R. Norton,
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc., a
Nevada corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y.
Sharp,
Defendants and Appellees

No. 900360

Motion for Stay Pending action on Petition for Certiorari is
granted. The case is remanded to the district court for the limited
porpose of fixing the amount of the bond to be posted.

Geoffrey J. Butler

Tab 9

ANDERSON & WATXINS
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. (#0108)
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (#3397)
Bruce Wycoff, Esq. *(#4448)
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES ;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP. ,
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE
RANCHES, a Utah general
partnership; and WHITE PINE
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general
partnership,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Civil No. C87-1621
Court of Aopeals
No. 90033*2-CA

vs.
JOHN C. SHARP; GERALDINE Y.
SHARP; and ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
as Trustees,
Defendants/Appellees.
JOHN C. SHARP; and GERALDINE Y.
SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.

STIPULATION RE:
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPERSEDEAS BOND

ROBERT FELTON; LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Uta'h corporation;
KENNETH R. NORTON dba
Interstate Rentals, Inc.; and
PAUL H. LANDES, individually;
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah
general partnership; and WHITE
PINE RANCHES, a Utah general
partnership; and WHITE PINE
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general
partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

The

Plaintiffs

and

Defendants,

through

counsel, hereby

stipulate as follows:
1.

On August 14, 1990, the Supreme Court of Utah issued that

certain order attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Order••).

The

Order provides that
Motion for Stay Pending action on Petition for
Certiorari is granted. The Case is remanded
to the district court for the limited purpose
of fixing the amount of the bond to be posted.
2.

The occurrence of the following actions by plaintiffs on

or before August 24, 1990, shall constitute full and complete
compliance with the bond requirement set forth in the Order:
a.

Subject to the provisions of this Stipulation, the

sum of $136,800.99 shall be deposited in the name of Shwildie
Bewedo, Inc. (hereinafter "Surety) in the following amounts

2
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in interest bearing accounts

in the following

financial

institutions (collectively, the "Banks"):
West One Bank —

$68,000.00

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. —
(The funds deposited

$68,800-99

in accordance with this paragraph,

together with such interest as may accrue thereon during the
period that such funds are so deposited, are hereinafter
referred to as the "Funds.")
b.

Certificates of deposit issued by the Banks (the

-Certificates") shall be signed in blank by the Surety and
deposited

by the Surety with the escrow agent mutually

selected by the parties and identified in Exhibit "B" attached
hereto (the "Escrow Agent"), who shall thereafter hold the
Certificates for delivery subject to and in accordance with
the terms and conditions of this Stipulation.

Copies of the

Certificates shall be delivered to Winder & Haslam, counsel
for the defendants.
c.

The

Surety

shall

execute

this

Stipulation

as

provided below for the purposes of acknowledging its agreement
(i) that the Funds and the Certificates shall be held in
accordance with the Stipulation for the sole and express
purpose of securing the Supplemental Supersedeas Bond attached

3
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hereto as Exhibit "C" (the "'Supplemental Bond"); and (ii) to
each and every other term and condition of this Stipulation.
d.

The Surety shall execute and deliver to Winder &

Haslam a UCC-1 Financing Statement in the form attached hereto
as Exhibit "D" (the "Financing Statement"), subject to the
terms and conditions of paragraph 4 below.
e.

The Supplemental Bond is fully executed and filed

with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Immediately on the occurrence of these events, plaintiffs shall be
entitled to deliver the letter attached hereto as Exhibit "E" for
the purpose of instructing the Summit County Sheriff in writing
that the Sheriff's Sale, presently scheduled for August 27, 1990,
pursuant to that certain Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated August 1,
199'0, and attached hereto as Exhibit "F," has b€*en stayed by the
Order and such sale shall be cancelled.
3.

By executing this Stipulation below, Escrow Agent agrees

to hold the Certificates in trust for defendants «a**i Cursfey subject
to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation and agrees to
deliver the Certificates
a.

to defendants, upon the entry of an order of the

Third Judicial District Court determining that Surety is
obligated to pay costs and damages to defendants pursuant to
4
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the terms and conditions of the Supplemental Bond, fixing the
amount of such costs and damages and directing Escrow Agent
to deliver such Certificates to defendants;
b.

to Surety or to such person or entity as the Surety

may direct in writing, if the Supplemental Bond shall become
void according to its terms;
c.

to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court,

in the event that Escrow Agent, acting
determines
instructions

that
from

it

has

received

in good faith,

conflicting

plaintiffs, defendants

or

the

written
Surety

respecting Escrow Agent's holding and/or delivery of the
Certificates, whereupon

any

such dispute

concerning

the

Certificates shall be resolved by an interpleader action in
the Third Judicial District Court.
4.

The Surety acknowledges and hereby grants defendants a

security interest in the Certificates and agrees to deliver the
Financing Statement for the sole and express purpose of securing
Surety's performance under the Supplemental Bond.

This security

interest is given for no other reason or purpose whatsoever.

The

parties expressly agree that neither the Funds nor the Certificates
shall secure the performance of the Surety's obligations under that
certain Supersedeas Bond in the amount of $79,793.36 previously

5

filed with the Clerk of the Court in this action (the ••Original
Bond"), which remains in effect.
5.

The Funds and the Certificates shall not be assigned,

transferred, cashed, or conveyed except as permitted by this
Stipulation, and shall not be encumbered unless such encumbrance
is expressly subordinated to the Surety's obligations under the
Supplemental Bond and is given by Surety no later than five (5)
days

after the date of this Stipulation.

acknowledge

their

approval

of

the

Defendants hereby

form

and

amount

term

is

defined

of

the

Supplemental Bond.
6.

If

the

Petition

(as that

in the

Supplemental Bond) is granted, then the stay of execution of the
Judgment (as that term is defined in the Supplemental Bond) shall
continue in effect until the District Court has (i) determined the
amount of any additional supersedeas bond (if any) required to
continue the stay in effect during the pendency of the appeal
before the Supreme Court of Utah; (ii) entered an order continuing
such stay and establishing the amount of any such additional bond;
and (iii) the period of time established in such order for the
filing of such additional bond shall have expired without the
filing of such additional bond.

The parties stipulate that, if

requested of defendants by plaintiffs, the parties shall jointly
request the Third Judicial District Court to conduct an evidentiary
6
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hearing concerning the necessity of any such additional bond and
the amount thereof,.
7.

Defendants have advised plaintiffs that if the Utah

Supreme Court does not grant or deny the Petition prior to
October 1, 1990, defendants may thereafter file a motion seeking
an order requiring plaintiffs to post an additional supersedeas
bond as a condition for the stay of execution remaining in effect
during the pendency of the Petition before the Utah Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs have advised defendants that under the terms of the
Order, the defendants are not entitled to seek or require the
posting of such additional bond during the pendency of the Petition
and that the posting of any such additional bond is not required
for the continuance of the stay of execution during such period.
The

parties

Accordingly,

are

presently

plaintiffs

(i) defendants

shall

unable

and

not

to

defendants

file

any

resolve
hereby

such

this

dispute.

stipulate that

motion

seeking

any

additional supersedeas bond or other security prior to October 1,
1990; and (ii) this Stipulation shall not prejudice the position
above of any party respecting the posting of additional security
during the pendency of the Petition after October 1, 1990; and
(iii) notwithstanding any motion defendants shall file to require
an additional bond as a condition for the continuance after
October 1, 1990, of the stay of execution, the stay of execution
7

shall continue in effect until the District Court has determined
the amount of any such additional supersedeas bond

(if any)

required to continue the stay in effect; (ii) entered an order
continuing such stay and establishing the amount of any such
additional bond; and (iii) the period of time established in such
order for the filing of such additional bond shall have expired
without the filing of such additional bond. The parties stipulate
that, if requested of defendants by plaintiffs, the parties shall
jointly request the Third Judicial District Court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing concerning the necessity of any such additional
bond and the amount thereof.
8.

Any obligations of the Plaintiffs and/or the Surety

pursuant to this Stipulation shall automatically cease upon the
Supplemental Bond becoming void according to its terms.
DATED:

August

1990.
ANDERSON & WATXINS

j^t&berr M. Anderson
Glen D. Watkins
Bruce Wycoff
Attorneys for Plaintiif3/Appellant3
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ANDERSON & HOLLAND

By jry~/i*, /&

/W/L/S^

Art

/r,-l*J

y John B. Anderson
/ /
Attorneys iox Coxmtexclaim-Def en&ant
Kenneth R. Norton
WINDER & HASLAM

Donald J. Winder
Kathy A. F. Davis
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The terms and conditions of the foregoing Stipulation are
hereby accepted and agreed to by Shwildie Bewedo, Inc., this 23rd
day of August, 1990:
SHWILDIE BEWEDOf INC.

9

ACKN0WIJ2DGEMENT
The terms and conditions of the foregoing Stipulation are
hereby accepted and agreed to by the undersigned, as the Escrow
Agent named therein:

-"• \L/:
Dated t h i s

^

tit*

>•<< r

day of /'/«• ,r>'l
1990.
Fd L\*\neP.s ~ITUT.

By..
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'A'
t

Its

* J -<^^'

>

Vl<

-L::mf/vr v

'c-kf-:±

JL:

CSRTTFIC&TB OF SERVICE
On this <^~ -^day of August, 1990, I hereby certify that I
caused to be mailed, via first-class United States mail, postage
prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing STIPULATION RE:
SUPPLEMENTAL SUPERSEDEAS BOND, to the following:
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
P. 0- Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Counterclaim-Defendant
Kenneth R. Norton dba Interstate Rentalsf Inc.
Stanford B. Owen, Esq*
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
P. 0. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Attorneys for Tracy-Collins and the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions
Robert Felton, Esq,
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and I caused to be hand delivered, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to:
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

(K:\CLX2HTS\WPR87245\0ai73TIP.75A)
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Donald J . Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2663
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (;801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al. ,
MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO INCREASE
LIABILITY ON BOND

Plaintiffs,
-vJOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Defendants.
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

Civil No. CS7-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

-vROBERT FELTON, et al.,
Counterclaim-Defendants.
Come

now, John

C. Sharp

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(the

"Sharps'1), by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby
move the Court for an order amending paragraph 2 of the Amended
Order Re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond dated May 14, 1990 (the
"Amended Order") to delete the phrase " . . . for a total judgment
of $938,053.02 as of February 12, 1990."
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As grounds for this Motion the Sharps state as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs, in their appeal of the Amended Order pending

in the Court of Appeals, Case No* 900332-CA, have argued that the
phrase at issue results in compounding of interest, despite the
specific itemization of each calculation of interest.
2.

The Sharps deny that the language has that effect and

agree that interest should not be compounded on the Judgment* The
issues on appeal can be simplified by the deletion of the language
at issue*
3.

This Court has jurisdiction to amend the Order to

conform to the decision and rulings of the Court actually made and
to aid in the presentation of the proceedings on appeal. Wasatch
Mining Co. v. Jehnincs, 14 Utah 221, 46 P. 1106 (1896); Peterson
v. Ohio Copper Co., 71 Utah 444, 266 P. 1050 (1928).
DATED this

7

day of November, 1990.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

Kathy, A.pF.^Davi$J
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
L hereby certify that, on the

y

day of November, 1990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO AMEND
AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND to be hand-delivered to
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the o f f i c e

of:
Glen D. WatJcins, Esq.
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
Valley- Tower, Seventh Floor
50 -West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018

and a copy of the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
to the following:
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Post Office Box 11643
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84147
David L. Gladwell
Chapter 7 Trustee
Post Office Box 12069
Ogden, Utah 84412

*7yjro^
TZ
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Tab 11

Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Suite 4004
175 West 200 South
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake Ci'ty, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for John C. Sharp
and Geraldine Y. Sharp
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION
In re
J. RICHARD REES
Debtor.

:
:
t:
:

Case No. 88B-03720
Chapter 7
ORDER

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by
the Sharps came on for hearing before the Honorable Judith A.
Boulden on the 14th day of November, 1988, at the hour of
11:00 a.m.

The Sharps were represented by their attorneys,

Donald J. Winder and Kathy A. F. Davis, and the Trustee David
L. Gladwell appeared.

Counsel for the debtor did not make an

appearance.
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the automatic stay imposed is
hereby modified to allow the Sharps to proceed with their
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state remedies of foreclosure, including publication of their
notice of sale.
DATED this

day of November, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

BL
JUDITH

A. BOULDEN, Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
THIS ORDER/J""
ENTERED
PHILIP C. PATTERSON
Attorney for Debtor

NOV 161988 ;

L
C-

. LERK

U.S. BAf-:i '.-.wPTCY COURT

&

DAVID L. GLADWELL
Chapter 7 Trustee

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

By:^_

Kathy A., P. Davis
Attorneys for John C. Sharp
and Geraldine Y. Sharp

-2-
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A

Robert Felton, 1056
310 South Main Street
Suite 1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone: 801-359-9216

3fu ifyt WLnitz^j §>tztzs l&zukvuytty £owt
district of 3tttafc, €zntvxl MUsicn
IN RE:
Case No. 88B-03720
Chapter 7

J. RICHARD REES
Debtor
**************************

MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING RELEASE
FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

Robert Felton, an interested party, as a Creditor of the above Debtor
action moves this Court to vacate its Order Granting Relief from the Automatic
Stay to John Sharp and Geraldine Sharp, and as grounds for this Motion states:
1.

Moveant filed a timely Proof of Claim for both himself and White Pine

* Ranches, a partnership.
2.

That a Request for Notice of all proceedings was duly filed in

September 1988, a copy of which is attahced hereto.

Notice was not given to

this Party.
3.

Moveants failed to give this Creditor notice which has deprived him

of the right to object or be heard at the hearing and is in direct contradiction
of Rule 27(d)(e) of the Rules of this Court.
The Relief from the Automatic Stay was improperly granted and this
Creditor believes that the factors set forth In Re Curtis (Bnkr. Utah) 40 BR 795
dictates that relief should not be granted and the estate of the Debtor, J.

ooso

Richard Rees, will be substantially depleted or impaired by said Order being
granted.
NOW, WHEREFORE Robert Felton moves this Court that the Order granting
Relief

from

the

Automatic

Stay

in the above

entitled

action

in

favor

of

Geraldine Sharp and John Sharp be vacated.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY by United
States

first-class

mail, postage prepaid to Philip Patterson, 427 27th Street,

Ogden, Utah 84401; Daivd L. Gladwell, Trustee, 4185 Harrison Blvd., Ogden, Utah
84403; Donald Dean Allen, 2870 Zanker Road, Suite 200, San Jose, California
95134; James Milton, PO Box 3900, Dept. N., Wayne, Pennsylvania, 19087; Mark
Gayiord, Attorney 15 West Broadway, Salt Lake City,Utah 84101; Donald Winder,
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this the
day of November.
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